The Role of the European Commission as a Modern Third Party Intervener in International Investment Arbitration by Wik, Cecilia Alexandra Isabella
						
 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS A MODERN 
THIRD PARTY INTERVENER IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Cecilia Wik 
3 October 2016 
 
University of Helsinki 
Faculty of Law 
Procedural Law 
Supervisor: Professor Dan Frände	 	
		
 
 
Tiedekunta/Osasto  Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty 
 Faculty of Law 
Laitos/Institution– Department 
 
Tekijä/Författare – Author 
 Cecilia Alexandra Isabella Wik 
Työn nimi / Arbetets titel – Title 
 The Role of the European Commission as a Modern Third Party Intervener in International Investment 
Arbitration 
Oppiaine /Läroämne – Subject 
Procedural Law 
Työn laji/Arbetets art – Level 
 Master’s Thesis 
Aika/Datum – Month and year 
 October 2016 
Sivumäärä/ Sidoantal – Number of pages 
 XIV+87 
Tiivistelmä/Referat – Abstract 
International investment arbitration is a preferred method for resolving investor-state disputes relating to 
alleged breaches of investment protection, forming part of substantive protection for cross-border 
investments within the vast network of international investment agreements. Since the birth of 
international investment arbitration in the 1960s, this institution has gone through notable developments, 
of which the presence of EU law and the European Commission as an intervening third party are some of 
the most recent changes. The role of the European Commission as a third party within the international 
arbitration regime has not, in this specific sense, been subject to academic research. It is therefore of 
interest and importance to research the role of the European Commission as a modern third party 
intervener in international investment arbitration.     
 
This thesis examines the case law of investment arbitration tribunals, most prominently the International 
Centre for Dispute Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in which third party interventions have 
taken place. Amicus curiae or third party intervention is a procedural right for interested third parties to 
intervene within investment arbitration, expressing their opinions relating to the dispute. The amicus 
curiae institution helps the arbitral tribunal in its most inherent task, which is to find the right decision in 
the dispute at hand, by enlightening the tribunal with information that would in the absence of such third 
party submissions be left outside its knowledge.   
 
As the international investment arbitration has gained more presence within the international judicial 
landscape it has also been put under the scrutiny of the public society. Through this public exposure the 
investment arbitration regime has been proven to lack important features of legitimacy and transparency 
and many initiatives have recently been taken in order to remedy these flaws. The investment arbitration 
regime has come to a modern era and simultaneously the amicus curiae institution has developed 
significantly. Through the codification of desires of various stakeholders and the practice of investment 
arbitration tribunals, there are today sufficient rules in order to establish the prerequisites for the 
acceptance of amicus curiae. Today, amicus curiae intervention is supported with the arguments that it 
enhances the transparency and legitimacy of international investment arbitration.  
 
The European Commission has been actively participating as a third party intervener in investment 
arbitration since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, when investment law was incorporated into 
the exclusive competence of the European Commission. This thesis examines the situations where the 
European Commission has intervened, and comes to the finding that the role of the European 
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1 Introduction 
Amicus curiae, “a friend of the court”, is not a new concept within international investment 
arbitration. It is a procedural right granted to non-disputing parties to submit opinions 
within arbitral proceedings. The original intention of accepting amicus curiae or third party 
interventions is that it helps the arbitral tribunal in its essential task, which is reaching the 
right decision in an investor-state dispute; a dispute between a private investor and a 
sovereign state for alleged breaches of investments protection. Through the evolution of 
the investment arbitration regime and the increased criticism against this “flawed” and 
“non-transparent” dispute settlement method, amicus curiae has become a channel for 
interested non-parties to have their voices heard. The role of the amicus curiae regime as 
boosting transparency has been a beloved subject within legal literature and the general 
view is that an efficient use of amicus curiae enhances the transparency of investor-state 
arbitrations by taking into account the public interest. This simultaneously leads to greater 
legitimacy and some of the flaws of the investment arbitration system can be remedied.  
 
Generally the amicus curiae parties that have expressed their opinions within investor-state 
arbitrations are NGOs, speaking for and protecting values such as the environment, 
peoples’ health or the right of indigenous people. The roles and impacts of these 
intervening organisations have likewise been much discussed in legal literature. Now a 
new player has entered the picture, the European Commission (EC), which has since 2010 
intervened actively in investor-state arbitrations. The role of the EC as a third party 
intervener has not been studied anywhere near to the same extent as other amicus curiae 
actors. Furthermore, no studies have been made on what implications the presence of the 
EC has within the context of the modern amicus curiae institution. It is therefore well 
founded to research the role of the EC as an amicus curiae party in international 
investment arbitration. This thesis will serve as a humble and modest contribution to the 
debate of the so-called “transparency hub” by particularly addressing the specific questions 
of the role of the EC and what implications its presence has for the international 
investment arbitration regime.  
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Starting with the formalities, I first explain the objective of this thesis and the choice of 
research methods. After this I explain what type of source material has been used and what 
the exact scope of this thesis is and how it is delimited. Going over to the subject matter, I 
will first provide the reader with a short history and background of the international 
investment arbitration regime. Following a historical examination of the subject matter, the 
amicus curiae system is addressed in the third chapter, in which I research the application 
and acceptance procedure of such third party submissions. In the fourth chapter, I discuss 
the transparency notion that complements certain fundamental characteristics of the 
“modern” amicus curiae institution. In the fifth chapter, I approach the modern amicus 
curiae institution from an EU law perspective addressing the role of the EC as a third party 
intervener in investment disputes. I also examine whether the same rules generally 
accorded to amicus curiae participation apply to the EC. In a separate sixth chapter, I 
examine and argue the implications of those findings within the context of international 
investment arbitration. The thesis is finally concluded with a short summary of the answers 
to the research questions. 
  
1.1. Objective of the Study 
A legal research is complete if it is made thoroughly, its aim is set out clearly and the 
outcome of the research can contribute to some sort of development within its relevant 
academic scope, whether it is a point of view or suggestion for improvement.1 It is also 
meaningful to provide the reader with a comprehensive description of the reasons for 
carrying out that specific research. This chapter therefore explains the objective of this 
thesis and why this research is important to carry out.  
 
One subject that has been studied much within legal literature is whether or not the amicus 
curiae institution works efficiently and in what extent it enhances the transparency of 
international investment arbitration. Legal literature addressing these matters are for 
instance “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: Can it Enhance the 
																																																								
1 Häyhä (1997), pp. 27-28; see also pp. 61-62, in which Lars D. Eriksson summarizes the idea 
behind his view on legal theory (appearing in ”Kritisk rättsteori såsom ideologikritik”, JFT 
5/1975), in which he proposes five steps in order to reach a new practice.    
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Transparency of Investment Dispute Resolution?”,2 by Maciej Zachariasiewicz and the 
recent publication “Transparency in International Investment Arbitration, A Guide to the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitration”,3 that 
addresses the incorporation of transparency related improvements in international 
investment arbitration. The general view is that the amicus curiae institution indeed is a 
procedural possibility in order to enhance transparency and that in certain circumstances it 
works efficiently.4 This thesis does therefore not go in depth into the arguments for or 
against the amicus curiae regime or whether or not it enhances transparency. Transparency 
is on its way to become a general principle within investment law and it has been proposed 
that the amicus curiae regime is an important channel for affected groups to be heard. I 
have chosen to instead research the specific role of the EC as a third party intervener and 
whether it is compatible with modern amicus curiae.  
 
Let’s get to the point – As mentioned, this thesis focuses on the role granted to the EC as a 
third party intervener, and whether the EC speaks for the same goals underlying the legal 
framework of the amicus curiae regime today. Thus an important question to be answered 
is whether the admissions of the EC as amicus curiae follow the underlying arguments and 
rules for accepting third party interventions. This is the first research question that this 
thesis addresses. The answer to this question will primarily be found through examining 
case law from investment arbitration tribunals and other international tribunals applying 
the amicus curiae regime setting out the rules to grant amicus curiae submissions. In this 
connection I also argue that the traditional role of amicus curiae has changed through 
recent developments and now has become what I will call the “modern” amicus curiae. 
 
When examining the EC in more detail, I take a closer look at EU law and the EU 
investment regime, which both have gone through some developments recently and where 
issues such as transparency are highly underlined. I will especially examine why the EC 
has taken a more active role with regard to third party submissions in investment disputes. 																																																								
2 “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: Can it Enhance the Transparency of 
Investment Dispute Resolution?”, Maciej Zachariasiewicz, Journal of International Arbitration, 
Kluwer Law International, 2012, Volume 29 Issue 2, pp. 205-224. 
3 Euler (2015). 
4 The condition under which the amicus curiae institution could work efficiently is when the 
procedure of this participation is made publicly available. See for instance ”Are Amici Curiae The 
Proper Response to the Public’s concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?”, Alexis 
Mourre, The Law and Practice of International Tribunals, Volume 5 Issue 2, 2006, p. 269. 
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The second research question is whether the participation of the EC serves the same goals 
generally accorded to the acceptance of amicus curiae interventions or whether it serves 
another goal. The third research question is what the implications of the outcome are and 
whether the role of the EC as a modern third party intervener can be acceptable.  
 
1.2. Research Method 
The notion of research method within legal science is diversified and no exhaustive 
definition can be found.5 The multifold character of law within the contemporary society 
also suggests that applying a certain predetermined research method is not only impossible, 
but also inappropriate.6 Instead of being able to talk about one prevailing research method 
within legal science, the methods used have to be adapted to the complex nature of law and 
to the eccentric character of different legal issues. The application of a variety of research 
methods is prominent for the legal research in Finland, even though we can distinguish 
clear patterns of more “traditional” methods used, such as legal dogmatic, legal history and 
comparative law.7  Historically the choice of legal research methods in Finland has 
generated some criticism as being perceived as too theoretical and lacking a pragmatic 
approach. As described by Lars D. Eriksson the legal discipline in Finland during the 50s’ 
and the 60s’ was a highly technically tainted discipline, where legal practitioners focused 
on the systemization and categorization of rules, legal definitions, jurisprudence and its 
foundations and methods of interpretation.8 A central point of criticism was the lack of 
argumentation and inquisitiveness; some themes that would later on be paramount in 
divers publications by Lars D. Eriksson, in which he often underlines that also values and 
interests make a great part of the legal argumentation.9 At a later stage, in the 20th and the 
21st century, when the research in international arbitration increased in Finland, a more 
pragmatic approach was adopted.10 Since dispute resolution is highly anchored in societal 
aspects dissociated from purely theoretical legal dimensions,11 a pragmatic approach is 
appropriate when researching international arbitration. Nevertheless, a reasonable opinion 																																																								
5 Häyhä (1997), p. 23. 
6 Ibid, pp. 15-16, 23. 
7 Aarnio (1997), pp. 36-37. 
8 Eriksson (1997), p. 57. 
9 See for instance “Samhällstillvänd juridik” from 1986 and ”Värderingar, fakta och juridik” from 
1969, both published by Lars D. Eriksson in JFT, a periodical by Juridiska Föreningen i Finland r.f.   
10 ”Några teoretiska aspekter angående alternativ konfliktlösning och medling”, Kaijus Ervasti, 
Retfærd Nr 97 2002/2, pp. 14, 17-18. 
11 Ibid. 
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is that the most dynamic result is obtained by applying a myriad of research methods 
adapted to the subject matter of the research.12  
 
The aim in this thesis is to incorporate a divers set of research methods in order to tailor 
the approach to suit international investment arbitration. The research methods used are 
adapted to, first, the sui generis characteristics of international investment arbitration. In 
order to get a broader picture of the investment arbitration regime in light of its 
surrounding legal frameworks, the underlying method used is holistic where the various 
procedural aspects of investment arbitration will be put in context and mirrored against 
underlying values and interests. The underlying research method is in other words law in 
context. Secondly, the particular research methods used are adapted to the relevant sub 
subjects researched. An explanatory research method is applied to the first part of the 
thesis, where the research focuses on the evolution of the amicus curiae institution. In the 
second part, a legal dogmatic method is used when the role of the EC is incorporated in the 
picture of the modern amicus curiae institution. The last part of the thesis applies an 
evaluative research method when the findings of the first and the second part are mirrored 
against each other.    
 
1.3. Scope and Delimitation 
Starting from the broader picture, within the scope of this thesis lies an examination of the 
development of transparency within international investment arbitration. Therefore, some 
political discussion will be included, in which the different desires of different stakeholders 
regarding transparency is discussed. The discussion of recent regulatory initiatives that 
have been taken to live up to these expectations likewise falls within this same political 
discussion. 
 
When narrowing down and focusing on the procedural aspect, we will see that the regime 
of investment arbitration includes a possibility for amicus curiae interventions. Since the 
possibility to intervene in an investor-state arbitral proceeding is a procedural right,13 such 																																																								
12 Koskenniemi (1997), pp. 173-174. 
13 Schwarzenberger (1986), p. 811; Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A. and vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 
May 2005, §. 13.  
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interventions do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Therefore an examination of 
the substantial rights of the parties will be left outside this research. As third party 
intervention is a procedural right within investment arbitration this thesis is categorized 
within procedural law. 
 
The investor-state arbitration regime is per definition, a cross-boarder phenomenon. Such 
international disputes are solved according to various international institutional rules and 
the geographic scope is global. Even though some domestic Finnish source material is 
used, this research is purely international without any connection to any domestic legal 
system. Nevertheless, this thesis lays a specific focus on an EU perspective, by examining 
the interaction between EU law and international investment law. The scope of this thesis 
is therefore international with a specific interest in EU law. 
 
Further, international arbitration can be divided into international investment arbitration 
and international commercial arbitration,14 at the same time forming the differentiation 
between public and private arbitration.15 The primary focus of this thesis is international 
investment arbitration, thus excluding a profound examination of international commercial 
arbitration, which is as a purely private method of dispute settlement.16 Nevertheless, this 
limitation is not strict, since, as we will see, the distinction between public and private 
dispute settlement is not always crystal clear and in order to get a better understanding of 
the investment arbitration regime, commercial arbitration is casually reviewed by way of 
comparison.  
 
When discussing the notion of transparency within international investment arbitration 
some limitation is also necessary. From a broad perspective, transparency touches upon 
topics such as treaty negotiations, the availability of information concerning ongoing 
disputes, the right for non-disputing parties to access case material, the possibility to 
																																																								
14 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 70; 
“Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Nigel Blackaby, Transnational Dispute 
Management, Volume 1 Issue 1, 2004, p. 1; “The Public-Private Distinction in the International 
Arbitration of Individual Claims against the State, Gus Van Harten, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Volume 56 Issue 02, April 2007, p. 372; De Brabandere (2015), pp. 49-50. 
15 Regarding the classification of investment arbitration as public law see chapters 2.3. and 4.3. 
below.  
16 Blackaby et al. (2015), §§. 1.04-1.05. 
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submit third party submissions and to attend hearings as well as the possibility to take part 
of rendered awards.17 Even if these aspects often go hand in hand and the separation of the 
same is not strict,18 this thesis primarily focuses on the procedural right of third party to 
submit amicus curiae submissions. 
 
1.4. Source Material 
As the subject of this research is international, likewise is the source material used. The 
sources material is found in legal literature, articles published in various academic 
periodicals, official publications from relevant international institutions and organisations, 
various press releases, information found on relevant websites as well as case law of 
international tribunal and courts. A prominent source material is the case law of 
international tribunals devoted to international investment arbitration as well as the case 
law from other international tribunals accepting amicus curiae applications. Some 
arbitration tribunals clearly focusing on investment arbitration, such as the ICSID,19 
provide annual reports and caseload statistics. Such statistics are used to get an overall 
picture of the amount of international investment agreements and bilateral investment 
agreements, concluded investment arbitrations and types of disputes. An important general 
remark regarding research on international arbitration is that relevant case law might not 
always be accessible to the public or, as is often the case, that only the final award is 
publicly available.20  This forms a restriction of the material that can be covered. 
 
																																																								
17 What comes to the notion of transparency in investment arbitration from a wide perspective, 
reference can be made to the abovementioned work ”Transparency in International Investment 
Arbitration, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty Based Investor-State 
Arbitration”, Euler (2015).  
18 The possibility to submit third party-submissions is logically depending on whether or not non-
disputing parties have access to information about on going disputes within relevant arbitration 
tribunals. The effectiveness of third party submissions again is depending on the content of the case 
material submitted by the parties as well as the content of the material officially published. Not 
knowing in detail the content of the party submissions makes it useless for non-disputing parties to 
waste time and money on third party submissions. It is therefore natural that the rationale behind 
the amicus curiae-system will loose its signification if the non-party would have to file a long shot 
submission. 
19 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
20 The reasons for this fact will be elaborated in chapter 2.3. when discussing the distinction 
between public and private arbitral proceedings. 
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1.5. Terminology 
This thesis centres on a number of keywords and it is necessary to describe these in an 
early stage in order for the reader to follow the discussion throughout this thesis. The 
underlying reason for the investment protection and the investment arbitration regime is to 
enable foreign direct investments (FDIs). FDIs are “investments made to acquire lasting 
interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor”,21 and which are 
accorded to boost economical and societal growth within a state.22 In this thesis the term 
“host state” is used to describe the state in which the FDI is made and “home state” to 
describe the state of the foreign investor. FDIs are protected by investment protection, 
which again can be defined as a broad economic term indicating any type of advance 
guarantee that an investment will be protected from being totally worthless.23  
 
A key aspect of investment protection is for instance that the contractual circumstances at 
the time of the investment decision stay unchanged during the lifetime of the investment.24 
Investments can be protected through investment legislation or investment agreements, and 
substantive protection can take form through, e.g., the prohibition of illegal expropriation 
or the right of investors to investment arbitration. 25 International investments are protected 
by a network of some 3000 international investment agreements (IIAs), which are 
agreements that sovereign states conclude in order to determine26 and protect investments 
between, reciprocally, the citizens of one of the state parties in the territory of the other 
state party.27 Within these treaties we can find both bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
which are treaties between two states, and multilateral investment treaties, which again are 
treaties concluded between more than two states.  
																																																								
21 This definition by UNCTAD is found at the following address: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx (accessed 1 October 
2016). 
22 Regarding the impacts of FDIs reference is made to chapter 2.1. below.   
23 McLachlan et al., (2007), p. 200. 
24 ”Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements”, Fact Sheet 
by the European Commission, 26 November 2013, p. 4.   
25 McLachlan et al., (2007), pp. 25-26, 30, 35, 41, 45. 
26 The definition investment is quite broad and there is actually no exact definition to be found. It 
has been proposed that the definition on investment is often left open within investment treaties to 
enlarge the scope of investments that would fall under the application of the investment protection 
provided by the investment agreement. A broader scope of application over the economic activities 
is naturally more attractive in the eyes of the foreign investor who now will be more eager to invest 
in that said state. 
27 De Brabandere (2015), p. 18. 
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The rules for the conduct of the arbitral process are often separate from the rules providing 
substantive investment protection. The procedural rules applicable in arbitration are called 
the lex arbitri.28 Within arbitration the choice of the lex arbitri is a priori up to be decided 
between the parties,29 which is an aspect rooted in the basic principles of consent and 
freedom of choice known to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The choice of the parties 
is in most cases confirmed by the signature of two or more parties of an IIA, which include 
their own procedural provisions or references to a set of rules regarding the conduct of the 
arbitration.  The most prominently used arbitration rules are the rules in the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID Convention),30 which will be much discussed in this thesis. When a dispute is 
settled before an ICSID tribunal, the set of procedural rules are the ones of the ICSID 
Convention and thus the lex arbitri is the arbitration rules in the ICSID Convention.31 
 
A last important keyword is the notion of amicus curiae.32 The amicus curiae right within 
investment arbitration is the right for third parties to intervene in the dispute. An amicus 
curiae is simply defined as a friend of the tribunal without becoming a party to the 
dispute.33 It is to be noted that within this thesis the words amici curiae and third party are 
used as synonyms for amicus curiae or simply amicus.   
																																																								
28 McLachlan et al., (2007), p. 84. 
29 In case the parties cannot come to an agreement the tribunal might be the one deciding upon the 
applicable law to the dispute. Another case where there might be a derogation from the wish of the 
parties is in case there is obliging, underlying legislation pointing towards another direction, 
prohibiting the wish of the parties.  
30 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States 1965. 
31 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 55. 
32 Amicus curiae will be further defined in chapter 3 below. 
33 L'entrée de la société civile dans l'arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur”, Brigitte Stern, Revue de 
l’Arbitrage Volume 2002 Issue 2, p. 329; “The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and 
Tribunals”, Lance Bartholomeusz, Non-state Actors and International Law 5, Koninklijke Brill 
NV, 2005, p. 211; “Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing Party 
Participation in Investment Arbitration”, Eloïse Obadia, ICSID Review, Volume 22 Issue 2 Fall 
2007, p. 371. 
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2 The International Investment Arbitration Regime 
Proceeding to the substantial part of this thesis, I start by describing the history and 
background of the international arbitration regime and some of its “fundamental”34 
characteristics.  International investment arbitration has its genesis in investment 
protection, taking form in international investment agreements, and it is the prominent 
dispute settling method for resolving investor-state disputes arising out of alleged breaches 
of investment protection. It comes naturally that a comprehension of the underlying system 
is essential before moving over to more detailed and specific issues. Before examining the 
procedural aspects of amicus curiae, I will therefore first address the history and the 
fundamental notions of investment protection and international investment agreements in 
general.  
 
2.1. History and Background 
“Money makes the world go around” is a well known saying, which also lies behind the 
birth of investment protection and consequently the investment arbitration regime. It is 
generally acknowledged that FDIs are extremely valuable for states wanting to boost their 
economical development.35 FDIs are in a key position in facilitating and boosting the 
economical growth of a country as well as in fighting poverty, especially in developing 
countries.36 For a state, FDIs bring in capital, which in turn creates more job opportunities 
and makes states and their businesses more competitive and inviting on the global 
market.37 FDIs formed a great part of the economic reconstruction after the Second World 
War.38 This applies especially to developing countries with rich natural resources, but 
lacking in technical and financial abilities to exploit these resources. The development of 																																																								
34 The word fundamental is within citation marks because, as we well see later on, these 
characteristics have changed a lot through the evolution of the investor-state arbitration regime and 
with new winds blowing in it can be said that what used to be a fundamental characteristic might 
today be the opposite; the public society might want to impose principles that simply go against 
what used to be a basic feature of investment arbitration.   
35 Dolzer; Schreuer (2012), p. 5; “Beyond Investment Protection: An examination of the potential 
influence of investment treaties on domestic rule of law”, Benjamin K Guthrie, International Law 
and Politics, 2012-2013, p. 1152.  
36 “Foreign Direct Investment and poverty reduction, Policy research working paper (2613)”, June 
2001, Michael Klein, Carl Aaron and Bita Hadjimichael, The World Bank, p. 2. 
37 “The Impact of Investment Policy in a Changing Global Economy”, Roberto Echandi; Jana 
Krajcovicova; Christine Zhenwei Qiang, Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice Group, The 
World Bang Group, October 2015, p. 4. 
38 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 6; De Brabandere (2015), p. 18. 
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such countries was therefore depending on investments from more developed countries to 
boost the exploitation of their natural resources. In this way capital exporting states 
transferred technological knowledge to developing countries through FDIs. 
 
In order to get the best benefits out of free trade and free flow of capital, the system has to 
be regulated and an enforcement system has to be available. Accordingly, in order for 
foreign investments to be effective and desired they need to be protected and regulated. 
FDIs are therefore controlled and protected through various IIAs.39 
 
The regime of international investment arbitration is built on treaties between states 
protecting these important FDIs. Thus recourse to arbitration forms a part of different ways 
to protect foreign investments. The contemporary era of international investment 
protection treaties traces back to 1959, when the first BIT was adopted.40 The desire to set 
up investment protection treaties started to gain importance through the economic 
globalisation and when investments between countries, often between countries with 
different legislative traditions, was liberalised. 41  When capital flow between private 
investors and foreign countries was liberalised ant started to increase, investors felt that 
their investments needed to be protected from governmental acts taken by the state hosting 
their investments.42 These acts could include, i.a., political innovations, such as the 
implementation of new policies turned into regulatory changes, judicial rulings and other 
administrative decisions,43 which in turn could result in for instance expropriations and 
nationalisations of private property. Simultaneously, safeguards for the protection of 
foreign investments were needed to attract foreign investors and generally for the 
international investment regime to work efficiently. 																																																								
39 More about the impacts of IIAs, see for instance “The Impact of Investment Policy in a Changing 
Global Economy”, Roberto Echandi; Jana Krajcovicova; Christine Zhenwei Qiang, Trade and 
Competitiveness Global Practice Group, The World Bang Group, October 2015, pp. 21-25, in 
which it is concluded that ratified IIAs can increase FDI to the treaty parties, and that the impact of 
positive investment flow is especially evident in developing countries. 
40 Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, United Nations (2000), pp. iii, 1. 
41 Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Volume II, Report to the 
Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, The 
World Bank Group, 1992 pp. 10-12. 
42 ”A Brief History of International Investment Agreements”, Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.C.-Davis 
Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 12, 2005, pp. 170-171, 177-179; De Brabandere 
(2015), pp. 19-20. 
43 ”Nouvelles Perspectives pour l’arbitrage dans le contentieux économique intéressant les États”, 
Geneviève Burdeau, Revue de l’Arbitrage, Volume 1995 Issue 1, pp. 29-30. 
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A special need to set up such a borderless system of guarantees and protections existed 
since there were great differences between the legislations and the legislative security 
between developing and developed countries.44 General rules of customary international 
law naturally applied to the relationship between an investor and a host state, but more 
detailed and straightforward substantial legislation was needed in order to achieve 
contractual stability. 45   This development expanded the territories in which private 
investors were willing to take investment risks, which in consequence made it possible for 
the host states to benefit from the investments. These goals contributed to the 
establishment and development of IIAs. 
 
Not only do the IIAs contribute to the system of international investment protection to be 
effective from the viewpoint of the host state, the IIAs also make an important contribution 
to the attractiveness of the international investment regime from the viewpoint of the 
investor. 46  From the viewpoint of the foreign investor, an important feature is the 
contractual stability, mentioned above. When foreign investors decide to carry out 
commercial projects in foreign states, which often can be characterised with long payback 
periods, they want to be safeguarded from unforeseeable and arbitrary national judicial 
decisions that can affect the profitability of the investments. In order for FDIs to be 
attractive, there should thus be contractual stability regarding the determination and 
protection of the investments the private investor is making. Contractual stability is 
achieved through legal certainty, in which, according to the principle of the rule of law, the 
legal situation should be foreseeable and based on written and clearly defined rules 
separating the judicial from the political powers and applicable in a non-discriminatory 
manner.47 Only if these requirements are fulfilled, the risks generated by a foreign 																																																								
44 Dolzer; Schreuer (2012), p. 5. 
45 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 4; “Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment Arbitration”, 
Ahmad Ghouri, International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 32, Kluwer Law International, 
2015, 
pp. 16-18. 
46 Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, United Nations (2000), p. 1. 
47 For a summary of the different notions of the rule of law, see for instance: “Colonization and The 
Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries”, Sandra F. 
Joireman, Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 15 Number 4, 2004, p. 321 and “Capitalism, 
Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society”, Ahmed A. White, 
Arizona State Law Journal, Volume 37, 2005, p. 764-766; Foreign Direct Investment, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, and The Rule of Law, Susan D. Franck, McGeorge Global Business & 
Development Law Journal, Volume 19, 2007, p. 344, 365-367. 
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investment in an unknown territory are reduced, at least to some extent, and the system as 
a whole appears more attractive. A proper application of the rule of law thus enhances the 
contractual stability in favour of the foreign investor. In an attempt to fulfil the requirement 
of legal certainty, the international community has created a regime of treaties that serve as 
legal frameworks for the protection of cross-border investments. These IIAs contain 
detailed substantive rights for the protection of foreign investments. Notwithstanding the 
independent character of the IIAs, they belong to a wider legal framework of potentially 
applicable (national and/or international) law and do not constitute to a self-sufficient legal 
regime untouched by the surrounding legal frameworks.48 This should be kept in mind 
throughout this thesis.     
 
The fact that there does not exist one big supranational institution addressing this question 
is mostly due to the failure of the international community to agree on one multilateral 
treaty, because of which states have signed such treaties separately with each other 
according to their specific needs.49 Therefore the international law community operates 
with BITs and IIAs. Multilateral treaties of importance according to their widespread use 
are the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the multilateral 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). These treaties include provisions that can be said to 
culminate to the general principles of international investment law. 50 These general 
principles of substantive investment protection include, i.a., provisions of non-
discrimination, most-favoured-nation clauses, requirements of fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) and rules regarding prohibited expropriation.51  
 
																																																								
48 Asian Agriculture Products Limited v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 
27 June 1990, §. 21; McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 15; Dolzer; Schreuer (2012), p. 16, 66-69; 
“Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment Arbitration”, Ahmad Ghouri, International 
Arbitration Law Library, Volume 32, Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 6. See also expressly the 
provision in the VCLT 31 (3)(c), stating that relevant international law applicable between the 
treaty parties shall accordingly apply with regard of the treaty under interpretation.  
49 There was an attempt to agree upon a multinational investment agreement, namely the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which was negotiated within the OECD during 1995-1998 
and which would give corporations wide rights to operate their international investments regardless 
of national laws. This attempt failed due to heavy criticism towards such an agreement by NGO’s, 
representatives for the civil society, and governments of developing countries.  
50 Dolzer; Schreuer (2012), pp. 13, 15. 
51 Ibid., pp. 98, 130, 191, 206. 
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2.2. Investment Arbitration 
An important procedural mechanism that amounts to the protection of investments, 
included in most of the multi- and bilateral investment treaties, is the right for the investor 
to refer investment disputes directly before international arbitration courts.52 A breach of 
one of the aforementioned general principles, e.g., the requirement of fair and equitable 
treatment, is a treaty breach for which the private investor can seek redress through 
arbitration. By doing so, the international investor does not have to rely on local domestic 
courts of the host state to have its claims heard and disputes resolved.53  
 
In the early stages, in the beginning of the 20th century, private investors had to rely on 
diplomatic protection between states to secure a fair treatment of their foreign investments, 
but some half a decade later, as arbitration was introduced as an alternative answer to solve 
investor-state disputes, investors could challenge states directly.54 Arbitration was initially 
introduced as a dispute settling method copied from what was already used between two 
private business parties, namely commercial arbitration. Hand in hand with he economic 
globalization after World War II, the use on investment arbitration also increased.55 The 
use of arbitration within investment law attained its foundation through the introduction of 
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in 1958 (the New York Convention) together with the signing of the first BITs in 
the late 50s and later on through other multinational investment agreements.56 A significant 
milestone was the establishment of the ICSID in 1965 and the adoption of the ICSID 
Convention. Through these developments arbitration became a universal tool to solve 
investor states disputes.   
 
Already at this stage a public law character was attached to investor-state arbitration. As 
McLachlan explains it, “[t]he result is dispute resolution which is arbitration in procedural 
terms, but which in substance has been said to share more of the characteristics of the 
																																																								
52 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 4; De Brabandere (2015), pp. 17-18. 
53 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 5; De Brabandere (2015), p. 21.  
54 De Brabandere (2015), p. 19. 
55 Newcombe; Paradell (2009), p. 24. 
56 The first BIT was signed on November 25, 1959 between Pakistan and Germany, the NAFTA 
came into force in 1994 and the ECT was signed in 1994 and came into force in 1998. 
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direct right of action before human rights courts”.57 In other words an analogy is drawn 
between investment arbitration and disputes before human rights courts, which are public 
procedures. 
 
The growth of investment arbitration since the establishment of the ICSID was 
nevertheless slow and still 30 years after its establishment only about one case per year 
was registered. But since 2000 some 30 cases have annually been registered, where the 
trend since is clearly increasing.58 Even though the specific public law character of 
investment arbitration was already recognized in an early stage, it was not until the number 
of registered investor-state arbitration cases increased, that investment arbitration actually 
started to evolve in a direction away from traditional commercial arbitration.59 
 
Arbitration in general is characterized by the requirement of consent by the parties to 
arbitrate. The consent marks the willingness of the parties to resolve the dispute through 
ADR instead of relying on traditional domestic court proceedings.60 When the underlying 
character of this type of settlement is consent, it also brings about a certain degree of 
flexibility with regard of how the procedure should be conducted, meaning that parties to 
an arbitration process posses a great margin of freedom of choice.61 Flexibility constitutes 
one of the main aspects that make arbitration an attractive method for resolving 
commercial disputes and covers issues such as choice of forum, choice of procedural rules 
and choice of arbitrators.62 Another fundamental character is confidentiality, which is of 
relevance regarding this thesis. As we will see in the following chapter, confidentiality is 
the feature that probably differs the most between commercial and investment arbitrations. 
 
It is to be noted that the use of arbitration to remedy an investment breach could be seen as 
a “last resort” remedy for the protection of the original investment. At the point where an 
investor has initiated an arbitral proceeding against the host state, the investment protection 
set up in the first place has actually already gone wrong, since the underlying IIA has 																																																								
57 McLachlan et al. (2007), pp. 4-5; see also De Brabandere (2015), pp. 57-58 and “Nouvelles 
Perspectives pour l’Arbitrage dans le Contentieux Economique intéressant l’Etat”, Geneviève 
Burdeau, Revue de l’Arbitrage, Volume 1995 Issue 1, p. 16. 
58 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2016-1), pp. 7, 9, 17. 
59 ”Nouvelles Perspectives pour l’arbitrage dans le contentieux économique intéressant les États”, 
Geneviève Burdeau, Revue de l’Arbitrage, Volume 1995 Issue 1, p. 9. 
60 Born (2014), p. 2123. 
61 Born (2014), pp. 2125-2126. 
62 Blackaby et al. (2015), §§. 1.79, 1.104. 
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failed to accomplish its purpose. According to some scholars, investment arbitration should 
be seen only as an exit amongst different investment protection mechanisms.63 Despite the 
fact that arbitration should not be seen as the first method of investment protection, an 
arbitration clause is indeed imperative for the protection and the promotion of 
investments.64  
 
Additionally, previous case law shows that investment arbitration plays a huge role in the 
overall politics of investment protection, since both the awards in, and effects of 
investment arbitrations are rather impressive and sometimes quite dramatic. An impressive 
arbitral award that has been rendered is, for instance, the Yukos case under the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules, in which Russia was held liable for a breach of investment protection 
towards three American claimants, former owners of the oil and gas company Yukos. The 
compensation awarded in 2014 amounts to 1.9 billion USD.65 Another significant award is 
the Occidental Petroleum case in 2012, in which the original award ordered Ecuador to 
pay compensation of 1.77 billion USD to two American companies.66 Of known concluded 
arbitral awards until the end of 2014, a total of five cases have resulted in awards where 
the respondent state has been ordered to pay compensations amounting to one billion USD 
or more.67  
 
2.3. Two Different Branches 
We can clearly recognize two main branches of arbitration within international arbitration 
today. On the one hand we can distinguish international commercial arbitration and on the 																																																								
63 Professor Kim Talus noted this when lecturing about energy investment protection during the 
Helsinki Summer Seminar in 2014 held at the University of Helsinki by the Erick Castrén Institute 
of International Law and Human Rights with the title “International Investment Law: Between 
Public and Private”. 
64 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2002, §. 54; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006, §. 57; Eastern Sugar B.V. 
(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, §. 
166. 
65 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
AA 227, Final Award, 18 July 2014, §. 1888. 
66 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012, §. 876. 
67 “Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Rachel L. Wellhausen, Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, January 2016, p. 17. See also footnote 77 about recent dropouts 
from IIAs and BITs. 
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other hand international investment arbitration.68 These two types of arbitration rely on the 
same type of dispute settlement and still share many common features, which still form the 
fundamental characteristics of arbitration. Nevertheless, an inevitable fact is that since the 
whole concept of investment arbitration has evolved, these once shared features are more 
and more taking different directions depending on whether we are talking about 
commercial or investment arbitration. Taking confidentiality as an example, it is treated 
differently in investment arbitration than in commercial arbitration. 69  In investment 
arbitration public law issues are resolved through a procedural playing ground that was 
originally drafted for private law disputes, which makes inevitable a certain degree of 
adaptation regarding the procedural aspects.70 
 
I argue that there are two main factors that contribute to the divergence of these two types 
of arbitration. These factors are, first, the difference in the substantive law, which is the 
underlying legal foundation and, secondly, the difference in the professional expectations 
on the arbitral tribunal. The underlying legal frameworks for international investment 
disputes are international investment agreements, concluded between sovereign states, 
such as BITs and other IIAs mentioned earlier, or alternatively the host state’s national 
investment law that includes protection for investors.71 In investment arbitrations the 
alleged violations are based on the promise of protection of investments derived 
specifically from treaties,72 and therefore concern matters of public international law.73  In 																																																								
68 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 70; 
“Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Nigel Blackaby, Transnational Dispute 
Management, Volume 1 Issue 1, 2004, p. 1; “The Public-Private Distinction in the International 
Arbitration of Individual Claims against the State, Gus Van Harten, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Volume 56 Issue 02, April 2007, p. 372; De Brabandere (2015), pp. 49-50. 
69 When deliberating where to find the balance between the need for transparency and the need to 
protect the procedural integrity of the arbitration in the Biwater-case, the tribunal stated that 
the”[c]onsiderations of confidentiality and privacy have not played the same role in the field of 
investment arbitration, as they have in international commercial arbitration. Without doubt, there is 
now a marked tendency towards transparency in treaty arbitration.” (Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) 
Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, 29 
September 2006, §. 114.); see also Blackaby; Richard (2010), p. 253; “Commercial and Investment 
Arbitration: How Different are they Today? The Lalive Lecture 2012”, Arbitration International, 
The Journal of the London Court of International Arbitration, Volume 28 Issue 4, 2012, p. 586; 
Born (2014), p. 2823; Gehring; Euler (2015), pp. 8-9. 
70 Blackaby; Richard (2010), pp. 245-255. 
71 McLachlan et al. (2007), pp. 25-26. 
72 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2014)”treaty” is defined as: ”An agreement formally 
signed, ratified, or adhered to between two countries or sovereigns; an international agreement 
concluded between two or more states in written form and governed by international law. 
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the alleged treaty breach, the private investor challenges acts taken by the state signatory to 
a treaty that protects investments. Such acts usually consist of a state exercising its 
sovereign power, e.g., by implementing a new policy in national regulations. This first 
main difference in comparison to commercial arbitration decisively places investment 
arbitration within public law. 
 
International commercial arbitration again arises from the promises derived from 
commercial contracts between the disputing parties, such as, e.g. a contract between two 
private companies about the delivery of certain goods.74 Contracts between two private 
parties, such as two private companies, are generally affect the business of these two 
companies only. The legal foundation of the alleged breaches is thus very different in 
comparison to that of investor-state arbitration. Commercial arbitration is based on 
contracts belonging to private international law and investment arbitration is based on 
treaties and consequently under public international law. These two types include very 
different substantive provisions and therefore the underlying legal foundation, the 
substantive law, applicable in commercial and investment arbitration are to be 
distinguished.75  
 
The second factor that motivates the different categorisation of these two types of 
arbitration is that the professional tasks of the arbitral tribunal are very dissimilar. Within 
commercial disputes the arbitral tribunal will solve the disputes between the parties by 
focusing on the execution of the underlying commercial contract, whereas the tribunals in 
investment arbitration will focus on examining the acts taken by a sovereign state and 
whether or not such acts constitute a breach of the promised investment protection.76 A 
sovereign regulatory act can easily be said to differ fundamentally from a private company 
applying a certain business model, e.g., a company not delivering the promised goods at a 
certain agreed time, and therefore breaching a contract. The tasks of the tribunal are 
																																																																																																																																																																							
73 McLachlan et al. (2007), pp. 6-7. 
74 Blackaby et al. (2015), §§. 1.01-1.05. 
75 “The Public – Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims against the 
State”, Gus Van Harten, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 56 Issue 2, 2007, 
pp. 373-375; “Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? The Lalive 
Lecture 2012”, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Arbitration International, The Journal of the London Court 
of International Arbitration, Volume 28 Issue 4, 2012, pp. 579-581. 
76 “Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Nigel Blackaby, Transnational Dispute 
Management, Volume 1 Issue 1, 2004, p. 1; Blackaby, Richard (2010), p. 255. 
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therefore very different and poses two totally separate worlds of requirements of expertise 
and specialization upon the arbitral panel. To successfully follow the discussion 
throughout this research concerning the evolving role of transparency and all the spices 
that comes with it, the distinction between these two types of arbitration and the basis for 
such a differentiation is important to keep in mind.    
 
2.4. International Investment Arbitration Today 
Leaving aside commercial arbitration, I will talk briefly about how the investment 
arbitration scene looks like today and the characteristics defining it. Even if there have 
been some drop outs from IIAs due to a depreciation of the investment agreement 
regime,77 the signing of BITs and other multilateral investment agreements has firmly been 
increasing since the signing of the first BIT in 1959 and today there are around 3000 
BITs.78 To be precise, at the end of 2015 there were 2926 BITs and 345 other IIAs.79 Since 
more states provide investment protection, and therefore a greater amount of private 
entities are within the scope of investment protection, consequently more investment 
arbitrations are initiated. According to the annual reports from leading arbitration centres, 
the number of registered investment disputes today is at its highest since contemporary 
investment arbitrations started to take place.80  
 
																																																								
77 For instance Italy announced in early 2015 its withdrawal from the ECT (effective as of 1 
January 2016), for reasons that are assumed to be due to the rising number of claims against Italy 
due to regulatory changes, and particularly against retroactive measures, within the renewable 
energy sector. In any case, according to the ECT as is the case in most IIAs and BITs, existing 
investment are protected during a 20 year long period following the withdrawal, according to the 
so-called “sunset-clause”. Earlier there have been some withdrawals from the ICSID; by Bolivia in 
2007, Ecuador in 2010 and Venezuela in 2012, as well as Venezuela’s withdrawal from the BIT 
with the Netherlands. 
78 For example from the end of 1980 to the end of 1990 the number of BITs increased five times 
from around 400 to nearly 2000. “Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999”, United Nations 
(2000), p. 1; “Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking”, United 
Nations (2007), p. 1. See also: World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance, UNCTAD, United Nations, 2015, p. 128. 
79 World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, UNCTAD, 
United Nations, 2015, p. 106. 
80 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2016-1), pp. 7, 9, 17; ICSID Annual Report 2015, p. 243. 
The SCC also saw a record of investor-state disputes in 2015 with a number of 12 cases. Statistics 
about the SCC can be found at: http://sccinstitute.com/statistics/investment-disputes-2015/    
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A good practical example of this new trend is the new UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
the Transparency Rules, which will be discussed more below.81 Furthermore, not only are 
many international organisations participating as amicus curiae, but also participating in 
the rulemaking by addressing matters relating to the procedural aspects of investment 
arbitrations and especially with regard to how the aspect of transparency should be 
intertwined in the whole process. 82 This strongly supports the argument that transparency 
within international investment arbitration is a timely and important topic that concerns not 
only legal practitioners, but also governments, NGOs, other interest groups and the public 
society as a whole. 
 
2.4.1. The popularity of Investment Arbitration 
The top three most used “arbitration packages”, meaning arbitration institutes and/or legal 
frameworks for the settlement of investor-state disputes are, first, the already mentioned 
ICSID and its arbitration rules providing both procedural rules as well as a forum for the 																																																								
81 Another good example is the revision in 2016 of the 2013 arbitration rules of the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). The revision would add to the arbitration rules separate 
rules applicable to investment disputes. The finalisation and publication of these rules, that was 
originally set to be during the first half of 2016, has seen some speed bumps due to substantial 
feedback from arbitration practitioners. Nevertheless the rules are incorporating the new trends 
within investment arbitration when it comes to transparency and third party submissions. In the 
words of the president of the SIAC Court of Arbitration, Gary B. Born the “The SIAC will also be 
introducing a new set of SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, which are intended to provide an 
efficient alternative to the ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules that States can adopt in their 
bilateral investment agreements or in other instruments.  The SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules 
will contain provisions on early dismissal of meritless claims, transparency of arbitral proceedings 
and third party funding.” Even though the mention of transparency is only a vague promise, the 
draft version of the amendments to the 2013 SIAC arbitration rules does include a new provision 
allowing written or oral submissions by a “non-disputing contracting party” on the interpretation of 
the treaty or contract as well as a possibility for “non-disputing parties” to “file a written 
submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute”. See p. 28 in the 
draft version of the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, which are available at: 
http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA%20Rules%20%28rev%2020160115%29.pd
f (accessed 8 June 2016).  
82 To name a few see, e.g., the work of the UNCTAD, which is continuously and profoundly 
researching the policy trends within the international investment regime and simultaneously 
seeking to help developing countries to participate in the law-making of international investment 
regulation, the work of the IISD, particularly focusing on the effective use of rules and institutions 
governing international investment law to attract investment that foster sustainable development 
by, e.g., introducing model BITs including sustainable development objectives. Regarding other 
initiatives by the IISD see particularly the ”Investment Treaty News Quarterly” (available online 
under the topic “Investment” at http://www.iisd.org/topic/investment, accessed 1 October 2016), in 
which the IISD addresses timely topics relating to investment arbitration) and the participation of 
CIEL in the negotiations of transparency within investor-state arbitrations within the UNCITRAL 
Working Group II Arbitration and Conciliation. 
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practical facilitation of investment arbitration. The second most used procedural legal 
framework is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
and its arbitration rules, however only providing arbitration rules without a specific 
governing institute. The third most used arbitration rules come from the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), which consequently is the 
second most used forum for investor-state disputes.83 As the UNCITRAL only provides a 
legal framework of procedural rules without a specific institution for investor states-
disputes, these are often conducted within the auspices of the ICSID, which also administer 
proceedings under other arbitration rules, such as ad hoc arbitrations.  
 
ICSID is an administrative body, founded in 1965 within the World Bank Group, that 
provides services for the facilitation of investor-state disputes through giving out 
arbitration rules as well as providing, i.a., hearing facilities and assistance in the 
appointment of arbitrators. As mentioned, the centre also administers arbitrations under 
other procedural rules, such as the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and also provides 
administrative and technical support for other arbitration institutes. The self-contained 
arbitration system under ICSID is private and wholly independent from all domestic 
proceedings. ICSID only provides investors and states procedural rights without according 
parties any substantive rights in form of investment protection. The main legal instruments 
are, the ICSID Convention84 including the arbitration rules in chapter IV and the ICSID 
Additional Facility Arbitration Rules (ICISD AF Arbitration Rules).85 Year 2015 was the 
50th anniversary of the ICSID Convention and it was also the busiest year in its history 
with the highest number of cases, 53 cases concluded, in one year. As a fun fact ICSID 
also experienced its 500th case since its establishment.86 The ICSID Annual Report for the 
fiscal year 2015 provides for excellent examples over the popularity of the use of the 
ICSID in investor-state disputes and as an indicator of the growing number of such 																																																								
83 SCC is mentioned in at least 120 of the BITs globally and, e.g., in the ECT as one of the 
alternative forums for investor-state disputes. With a total number of 85 registered cases since the 
first case in 1993, the SCC constitutes the second most popular institute for such disputes after the 
ICSID with over 500 registered cases.  
84 The ”Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States” entered into force 14 October 1966 and is today ratified by 153 countries and signed 
by eight. Updated information can be found on the website of the ICSID: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-
States.bak.aspx?tab=AtoE&rdo=BOTH (accessed 11 September 2016).   
85 ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, in force since 10 April 2006. 
86 ICSID 2015 Annual Report, p. 5. 
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disputes generally. Exclusively focusing on investment arbitration, and thus excluding 
commercial arbitrations from its activity, the ICSID is clearly the leading institution for the 
settlement of investor-state disputes administering about 65% of the overall investor-state 
cases,87 and accordingly my research will mainly focus on the case law within the ICSID. 
 
2.4.2. Some Timely Topics 
The growing number of registered cases has also amplified the public’s attention to the 
investment arbitration regime generating debates about its flaws. Investment disputes cover 
very different subject matters reaching from environmental issues, human rights, public 
health and social wellbeing issues as well land and building rights and the rights of 
indigenous people.88 An economic sector that has been increasing within investment 
arbitrations is the energy sector, with an investment protection treaty of its own kind, the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Energy arbitration today fills up about one third of the 
ICSID’s caseload.89  Already a listing of these diversified and important subjects, prone to 
be underlying themes of the disputed matters, makes the reader understand that there is a 
myriad of concerned entities and voices that want to be heard. Heavy public scrutiny and 
criticism proves that international investment arbitration today is on thin ice and that its 
future potential and endurance as a dispute settlement method is indeed pushed to its 
edges.90 Numerous scholars also suggest that investment arbitration is facing a backlash 
against a system burdened by too many applicable regulatory instruments amounting to, 
i.a., conflicting awards, high costs and longer delays,91 not to mention the issues of too 
little transparency and lack of legitimacy that have since decades been subject to vast 
debate.92 The question whether this institution will prevail based only on the traditional 																																																								
87 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2016-1), p. 9; see also: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution (accessed 25 May 2016). 
88 Kun (2016), p. 300. 
89 ICSID 2015 Annual Report, p. 25. 
90 “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Meg 
Kinnear, Symposium Co-Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, 2005, p. 2; Gehring; Euler 
(2015), pp. 7-9; “Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Rachel L. Wellhausen, 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2016, pp. 1-2. 
91 Waibel, Kaushal, et al. (2010), p. xxxvii-xli; W. Park (2013), p. 3; Blackaby; Richard (2010), pp. 
31-39. 
92 “L'entrée de la société civile dans l'arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur”, Brigitte Stern, Revue de 
l’Arbitrage Volume 2002 Issue 2, p. 329; “Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, 
Nigel Blackaby, Transnational Dispute Management, Volume 1 Issue 1, 2004, p. 1; “Are Amici 
Curiae The Proper Response to the Public’s concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?”, 
Alexis Mourre, The Law and Practice of International Tribunals, Volume 5 Issue 2, 2006, p. 266; 
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characteristics of arbitration seems to have been answered long ago, and the answer is 
definitely in the negative. What now is being done on many levels is that stakeholders 
representing different regimes and underlying values are cooperating in an effort to 
reconstruct the system. 93  These interest groups includes scholar, practitioners, state 
representatives and representatives of the private sector as well as institutions speaking for 
the greater public.  
 
Today there are many ongoing negotiations of international investment agreements and a 
timely debate, which also includes some important discussions about the transparency 
issue, the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the United States and the EU can be mentioned. It is of relevance to discuss this 
here, since the question concerning the inclusion of an Investor State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism in the TTIP has launched a rough debate regarding investment 
arbitration generally. The flame that is keeping this debate on fire is the claim that 
investment arbitration is deemed to lack legitimacy, as does accordingly the ISDS 
mechanism. The EU has, in order to relief these concerns, expressly stated that it will 
																																																																																																																																																																							
Blackaby; Richard (2010), pp. 255-256; Waibel, Kaushal, et al. (2010), p. xxxvii-xli; “Rethinking 
the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line 
Favourably for the Public Interest”, Katia Fach Gómez, Fordham International Law Journal, 
Volume 35, 2012, pp. 545-555. Already in 2001 the problem of legitimacy was identified in the 
Methanex-case when the tribunal (in Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici 
curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 49) states that “[t]here is also a broader argument, as suggested by the 
Respondent and Canada: the Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as 
more open or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's 
willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration 
in particular; whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm.” In 2005 the OECD Investment 
Committee further underlined the issue in a statement, where it states that the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of investment arbitrations would benefit of an increased transparency. Even though the 
OECD in its statement primarily mentioned a more unforced view on the publication of arbitral 
awards it also underlined the importance of third party participation in investor-state disputes that 
are prone to address matters of great public interest. 
93 The UNCTAD stated already in 2007 that even though only a minority of the BIT included 
provision on transparency, the trend forecasted a more open approach to transparency matters from 
different stakeholders and not only limited to the exchange of information but with a broader 
perspective covering new procedural grounds. See “Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: 
Trends in Investment Rulemaking”, United Nations (2007), p. xiii. Since then many other 
stakeholders have contributed to the development and as for some of the most recent contributions 
the following can be mentioned: the revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules including the 
Transparency Rules, which started in 2010 by the UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation), and ran until 2014 when the Transparency Rules came into. Consequently this work 
generated a lot of research and debates and discussions concerning the transparency-issue, 
undoubtedly leading to significant regulatory changes. 
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apply transparency not only to the negotiations but also regarding the eventual ISDS-
mechanism attached to the TTIP.94 As the negotiations are still not finalized and the 
contract not yet signed, the discussion within this thesis will stay at a speculative level and 
the negotiations and the surrounding debate will instead serve as examples of a timely 
topic. However, the TTIP discussion is not be given much weight in this thesis, since it 
does not actually propose anything novel with respect of transparency within investor-state 
arbitration or the investment arbitration regime. There are already existing “transparency” 
tools that can, and probably will, be used within the integration of the ISDS into the 
TTIP.95 
 
It is nevertheless today an accorded opinion that the investment agreement regime as it is 
today is out-dated and serves the wishes of the stakeholders from the early times when the 
treaties where drafted. Another identified important reform challenge relates to that the 
investment dispute settlement method goes through a “legitimacy crisis” as certain flaws of 
the system are now affecting the originally valuable benefits gained through FDIs. 
Consequently, this might this lead to that investor-state arbitration today actually exposes 
the host state to greater legal and financial risks. These issues will be addressed further in 
chapter 4, when talking more about the legitimacy argument. Nevertheless, it should 
already be mentioned that a recent trend amongst arbitration centres and organisations 
providing procedural legal frameworks for investor-state arbitration is the revision of the 
arbitration rules to better meet the desires and opinions of the increasingly active public 
society. 
 																																																								
94 In March 2014 The EU launched a public consultation on investment dispute resolution within 
the TTIP negotiations with the aim of effectively integrating various stakeholders’ opinions and 
ideas to EU’s approach towards the dispute settlement mechanism that was to be included in the 
future treaty. The European Commission particularly stated that it would aim for a more 
transparent dispute settlement method than currently available according to the BITs in force. The 
EUs policy on the subject will not only be applicable to the TTIP but also to future BITs signed 
between an EU member state and a non-EU state. The European Commission received almost 150 
000 online contributions of which a clear majority was made by individuals representing the civil 
society. The consultation process involving many stakeholders representing different interest 
groups provides for an excellent example of initiatives towards a lucrative development of the 
investor-state arbitration regime. The report of the consultation was published in January 2015 and 
can be found at the following address: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 (accessed 30 July 2016). 
95 The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are already inserted in the newly adopted free trade 
agreement between the EU and Canada, the CETA, and it is proclaimed that a similar mechanism 
will be incorporated in the TTIP, which means that the EU could simply use this mechanism 
instead of trying to come up with a new solution.  
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2.5. International Investments within the EU 
The TTIP discussion concerns a potential multilateral investment agreement and it would 
be binding between the United States and the member states of the European Union. In 
addition, there are numerous BITs in force between EU member states and third countries, 
which like today will continue to be under the administration of the EU. The EU has 
recently taken a more active role regarding international investments and the EU 
investment policy is being reshaped. With the aim of harmonising investment agreements 
and the negotiations of such agreements, which used to be within the discretion of the 
member states, the EU now has more leverage to manage international investments and 
rewrite the entire EU investment policy. This new common investment policy has to be 
shaped in connection with questions regarding international investment policy more 
generally, like the desire to improve transparency, which is a very prominent theme in the 
EU’s investment policy.96 The task of the EU will certainly not be easy when the interplay 
between the desired level of investment protection, the existing freedoms of member states 
and the opinions of the public society all have to be taken into account. This chapter serves 
as support for the understanding of the underlying policies and desires that the EU has 
imposed within the investment law context. The underlying reasoning and argumentation 
will be of relevance when the goals of the EU will be balanced against the aims voiced 
within the international investment arbitration community regarding transparency. 
 
The approach and the policy of the EU, will become apparent during the ongoing 
negotiations of the TTIP, and since the negotiations are still under progress, the description 
in this chapter will be made on a rather superficial and speculative level. The basic 
background of the EU investment policy will instead be based on the approach the EC has 
taken with regard to BITs that are in force within member states of the EU and with third 
countries. Additionally, reference is made to chapter 5, where the discussion covers the 
interaction between EU law and investment law by focusing on the role granted to the EC 
as an amicus curiae party in investment arbitration. 
 
																																																								
96 International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), Annex: Communication of the Commission 
“Towards a comprehensive European International Investment Policy”, p. 10. 
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Today FDIs form a part of the EU’s common commercial policy,97 and the EU has an 
exclusive mandate regarding EU investment issues.98 This means, i.a., that the EU can 
impose legislation concerning foreign investments and that the EU is empowered to 
conclude trade and investment agreements with third countries. The basis for the EU’s 
leveraged approach regarding international investments was approved through the signing 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force 1 December 2009.99 According to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has exclusive competence to conclude international agreements 
concerning FDIs in its territory.100 There are still some 1200 BITs101 within the EU 
member states and the extended competence of the EU does not mean an automatic 
termination of these treaties, rather an implication of efforts of harmonizing the field of 
investment protection by means of reshaping it. 
  
The “new” EU investment policy aims at a better investment environment through market 
access for investors, legal certainty as well as stable and predictable atmosphere that builds 
on aspects such as the free flow of investment-related capital and especially on long-term 
investments.102 It is on the agenda of the EU to progressively replace the BITs that member 
states have signed with third countries by so called EU agreements. This processes strives 
to fulfil one of the main goals of the new EU investment policy, which is to support legal 
certainty and transparency,103 but naturally at the same time by ensuring that the member 
states’ right to regulate on a national level stays intact for both the host and home states. In 
the heart of the EU investment policy today is the fostering of transparency both in treaty 																																																								
97 The term ”common commercial policy” is used in the TFEU and is one of the main pillars of 
EU’s integral functions. The scope of EU’s exclusive competence covers the area of the common 
commercial policy and through the amendments in the Treaty of Lisbon, also FDIs’ are covered by 
the EU’s common commercial policy.    
98 International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), Annex: Communication of the Commission 
“Towards a comprehensive European International Investment Policy”, p. 11. 
99 In accordance with point (e) of Article 3(1) of the TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence 
regarding the common commercial policy and may be a party to international agreements including 
provisions on foreign direct investment. This provision was inserted through the Treaty of Lisbon. 
100 International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), Annex: Communication of the Commission 
“Towards a comprehensive European International Investment Policy”, p. 12. Through the 
ratification of the Lisbon treaty the TFEU now includes in its article 207 the mandate for the EU to 
determine regulatory matters regarding FDIs through scoping them within the common commercial 
policy. 
101 Updated information on the international investment treaties and bilateral investment treaties in 
force see the following website: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (accessed 4 September 
2016). 
102 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/ (accessed 1 October 2016).    
103 Ibid.    
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negotiations as well as within investor-state dispute settlement. In order to “foster 
transparency” the goals of the EU policy is, i.a., to clarify the regulatory framework behind 
legislation related transparency. 
 
The competences of the EU have further been empowered through the Regulation 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between 
member states and third countries, which came in to force on the 12 December 2012 (EU 
Regulation), 104 the aim of which is to progressively replacing the BITs in force within the 
EU and third countries. One of the main goals of the EU Regulation is to create better legal 
certainty for investors operating within the EU and third countries. In practice the 
regulation brings upon member states an obligation to notify the EC of BITs in force as 
well as of amendment negotiations of such BITs. This enables the EC to assess the 
provisions in force or to be taken into force in case of amendments, and to ensure that 
these do not pose obstacles to the negotiations or conclusion by the EU of BITs with third 
countries.105 The EU Regulation was a first step of the EU to embody its competences 
regarding investment policy as granted through the Lisbon treaty, but it is of importance to 
notice that the treaty excludes intra-EU BITs from its application.106 
3 Amicus Curiae 
We now go over from a political discussion to the theoretical aspects of investment 
arbitration procedures, and it is time to get a deeper knowledge of first, where the tribunal 
derives its power to accept third party submissions, secondly, what the prerequisites to file 
such submissions are, and lastly, what rights the most recent procedural legal framework, 
																																																								
104 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member 
States and third countries. 
105 Article 5 in regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries. 
106 Article 1 § 2 in regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries. As the cases where the EC has participated relate to 
intra-EU disputes, the EU regulation is mentioned to show the intentions of the EU institutions 
towards investment law. 
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the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, gives an amicus curiae-actor.107 Again for a better 
understanding of the big picture, I start by addressing the definition, history and 
background of amicus curiae. Following the research of the prerequisites to act as amicus 
curiae, I will show how the duty and function of the amicus curiae institution has evolved. 
As we will see in the next chapter, the arguments behind accepting third party 
interventions are those in favour of public interest and enhanced legitimacy of the investor-
state arbitration regime, which together are characteristics of the modern role of the amicus 
curiae institution. It is essential to provide the reader with these general notions of amicus 
curiae in order to follow the discussion whether or not the acceptance of the EC as a third 
party is based on the said prerequisites and arguments.    
 
Amicus curiae submissions are generally accepted in order to aid the tribunal in finding the 
right decision with regard to matters of either fact or of law.108 As we will see in chapter 4, 
the amicus curiae regime has recently been strengthened and cases before the ICSID 
tribunal with third party participation have increased heavily. An example that can be 
mentioned is the Eli Lilly case,109 which is a dispute under the NAFTA that addresses 
matters of patent law, and which saw many contributions by third parties. In the said case 
the tribunal received nine separate applications of petitioners that filed for amicus. These 
applications included applications from three groups of trade associations, regional 
organisations, a group of academics and seven intellectual property law professors.110 The 
hearings in the Eli Lilly-case, that lasted for over a week between May and June 2016 
where de facto held in public within the auspices of the ICSID in Washington.      
 
																																																								
107 Since the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are relatively new, and have been pointed out to be 
applicable in only two known cases so far the impact of these rules are still difficult to examine. 
These known cases are the case of Iberdrola, S.A. and Iberdrola Energia. S.A.U. v. Bolivia (PCA 
Case No. 2015-05) and BSG Resources Limited v. Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/22). In addition the application of these rules are still rather limited and the application is 
vastly dependent on the will of their application by the arbitrating parties.   
108 Rule 37 (2) (a) in the ICSID Arbitration Rules refers to that “the non-disputing party submission 
would assist the tribunal in the determination of the a factual or legal issue related to the 
proceeding…”. Likewise the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Article 4 in the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules) gives a third party the right to address matters of legal or factual nature. 
109 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2. 
110 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order No. 4, 23 February 2016. 
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3.1. General Remarks on Amicus Curiae 
3.1.1. Definition 
Even though amicus curiae was briefly defined in the beginning of this thesis, its 
importance necessities a more detailed explanation. In the literary sense amicus curiae111 is 
described as “a friend of the court”.112 This term will serve as a suitable starting point for 
the description of an amicus curiae or a third party intervener, as it is also called, within 
investment arbitration proceedings.113 To enlighten the contextual definition of the term, 
we can turn to relevant case law. In one of the first ICSID cases where the tribunal has 
accepted amicus curiae submissions according to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, namely the 
Aguas Argentinas case, the tribunal defined amicus curiae as the following:  
“An amicus curiae is, as the Latin words indicate, a “friend of the court,” and is not 
a party to the proceeding. Its role in other forums and systems has traditionally been 
that of a nonparty, and the Tribunal believes that an amicus curiae in an ICSID 
proceeding would also be that of a nonparty. The traditional role of an amicus 
curiae in an adversary proceeding is to help the decision maker arrive at its decision 
by providing the decision maker with arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the 
litigating parties may not provide.  In short, a request to act as amicus curiae is an 
offer of assistance – an offer that the decision maker is free to accept or reject.  An 
amicus curiae is a volunteer, a friend of the court, not a party.” 114  																																																								
111 Within legal literature today synonyms for amicus curiae/amicus curia/amici curiae is “third 
party”. Historically the use of the Latin wording originates from the development within the 
common law system, whereas the English wording was used in civil law traditions.111 Even though 
the approaches to the institution of amici did differ between these two legal traditions, the core 
meaning of the terms used is evidently the same. In this thesis, I use both of these terms as 
synonyms, owing exactly the same meaning and without prejudicing or privileging either the civil 
law or common law traditions regarding the non-party mechanism. 
112 L'entrée de la société civile dans l'arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur”, Brigitte Stern, Revue de 
l’Arbitrage Volume 2002 Issue 2, p. 329; “The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and 
Tribunals”, Lance Bartholomeusz, Non-state Actors and International Law 5, Koninklijke Brill 
NV, 2005, p. 211; Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing Party 
Participation in Investment Arbitration”, Eloïse Obadia, ICSID Review, Volume 22 Issue 2 Fall 
2007, p. 371. 
113 Black’s Law Dictionary (2014) defines “amicus curiae” as “someone who is not a party to a 
lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because 
that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.” See also Schwarzenberger (1986), p. 811, 
where amicus curiae is defined as “attempted or accepted intervention in proceedings by an 
outsider to assist a court or an unrepresented interest.”  
114 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to 
Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 13. The tribunal 
derived its power to accept third party interventions from the reserved power granted to it by 
Article 44 of the ICSID Convention to decide on unanswered procedural questions (see §. 10, 16). 
The provision in rule 37 (2) of the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules allowing third party 
submission came into effect 10 April 2006, and was thus not applicable to this case. Nevertheless 
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The tribunal here provides for a rather exhaustive definition of the term and many aspects 
can be read from this passage. First, the tribunal makes an analogous application in this 
ICSID proceedings of what has been declared about the role of an amicus curiae in other 
forums, stating clearly that the amicus curiae is not a party to the dispute tried before the 
tribunal,115 neither does an amicus party have any adjudicating role.116 It is important to 
underline that the amicus will not be recognized as a party to the dispute. The difference 
between a party and a non-party is naturally the different scope of the rights that the actors 
are entitled to within the proceedings as well as the rights and obligations of the parties 
that the award may impose. 
 
The NAFTA Methanex case, to which the tribunal in the Aguas Argentinas case makes 
reference, should also be mentioned. In the Methanex case from 2001, which was resolved 
under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the tribunal stated that “… the receipt of 
written submissions from a person other than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to 
																																																																																																																																																																							
the tribunal in the Aguas Argentinas-case states that the criteria it set out to for the amicus curiae-
party to meet is in accordance with the requirements set out in the amended arbitration rules (see 
Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to make 
an Amicus Curiae Submission, 12 February 2007, §. 15). 
115 In this connection the tribunal does not make a direct reference to any specific case or system 
but in general terms it often refers to the Methanex-case (Methanex Corporation v. United States of 
America, UNCITRAL) relating to the role of an amicus curiae. Furthermore, in the means to 
support acceptance of qualified amicus curiae submissions in appropriate circumstances the 
tribunal makes reference to international arbitral proceedings in the practices of NAFTA, the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, and the WTO.   
116 In the Aguas Argentinas case the tribunal also makes reference to the Methanex case in support 
of the view that admitting submission from non-parties to the dispute does not make them parties to 
the arbitration (see Order in Response to Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus 
Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 14). The wording of the tribunal in the Methanex case is also approved in 
the UPS-case (see United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 
October 2001, §. 39). The application to intervene as a third party in the Methanex case was made 
according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976. The wording of the tribunal in the Methanex 
case was the following: “[article 15(1)] cannot grant the Tribunal any power to add further 
disputing parties to the arbitration, nor to accord to persons who are non-parties the substantive 
status, rights or privileges of a Disputing Party” (§. 27) and that “[t]he Tribunal is required to 
decide a substantive dispute between the Claimant and the Respondent. The Tribunal has no 
mandate to decide any other substantive dispute or any dispute determining the legal rights of third 
persons. The legal boundaries of the arbitration are set by this essential legal fact. It is thus self-
evident that if the Tribunal cannot directly, without consent, add another person as a party to this 
dispute or treat a third person as a party to the arbitration or NAFTA, it is equally precluded from 
achieving this result indirectly by exercising a power over the conduct of the arbitration.” (§. 29). 
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adding that person as a party to the arbitration”,117 by adding that the party intervening as 
an amicus curiae is neither to be seen as an expert nor as a witness.118 On the other hand 
the tribunal has noted that the line might be blurred and that the submission of an amicus 
might cover such issues that generally can be provided by independent experts.119 
Nevertheless, this characterisation of the role of an amicus curiae will facilitate the 
determination of the rights and powers of a third party intervener within investment 
arbitration. 
 
Secondly, the tribunal gives the third party intervener quite free hands regarding the 
content of its submission. Instead of being a party, a witness or an expert, the role of an 
amicus curiae consists of aiding the court within its fundamental task of finding the correct 
solution to the dispute by providing “arguments, perspectives and expertise” related to the 
subject matter of the case. In its third party submission, the “outsider” will provide the 
tribunal with viewpoints on either points of law or of fact, which in absence of the said 
intervention would not come to the knowledge of the tribunal.120 As a second remark it can 
be mentioned that by connecting the traditional role as a “friend to the court” with the 
formulation of its own definition, the Aguas Argentinas tribunal furnishes the third party 
intervener with a wide range of possibilities of intervention forming an excellent channel 
for unrepresented voices to be heard in disputes, the effects of which may stretch further 
than only to the disputing parties. 
 
Thirdly, the tribunal also stated that the request to act as amicus curiae is sort of an “offer 
of assistance”, which is thereafter to be either accepted or declined by the tribunal. As we 
will see later on in chapter 3.2.2., this forms a basis for the fact that the tribunal does not 
have an obligation to accept even fully qualified requests for third party interventions. 
Before going into this question it is however relevant to map out the different criteria that a 
qualified request should contain. Consequently it can be seen from this case, as will be 																																																								
117 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 30. 
118 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §§. 36, 38. 
119 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 62. 
120 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to 
Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 13; McLachlan et 
al. (2007) pp. 57-58; Dimsey (2015), pp. 129-130. 
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supported by other case law, that instead of having an obligation or a prohibition, the 
tribunal has a large margin of appreciation in either accepting or declining a request to 
intervene, or even to invite amicus participation on its own initiative.    
 
3.1.2. Background 
The history of amicus curiae traces as far back as to Roman law, where it was used to 
bring into the attention of the judicial system facts and views that would otherwise not 
come to its knowledge.121 During the developments of the amicus curiae institution after 
the Roman traditions, the institution became quite vastly established in common law, 
especially in the US legal system within the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.122 The 
developments within the common law system rejected the view of the amicus as a party to 
the dispute, whereas the civil law tradition was more willing to grant interveners wider 
rights.123 In more recent history, during the later part of the 20th century, and especially 
since two and a half decades, the system of third party intervention has become broadly 
known within the field of international law in connection with disputes in front of various 
international courts and tribunals.124  
 
Traditionally we can distinguish two sorts of third party interventions where the interest to 
intervene might vary. The intervention can first address questions of treaty interpretation, 
by another, third treaty party.125 In this situation the intervening third treaty party will 
submit worthy information about the interpretation of the treaty connecting the parties to 
the dispute, but not owing a particular interest in the subject matter of the case but instead 
on the general interpretation of the treaty. Secondly, a special interest in the subject matter 
of the dispute can be the incentive for a non-party to intervene.126 An excellent example of 
a third party intervention with a special interest in the subject matter is a NGO with the 
mission of protecting the environment, e.g, intervening in a dispute regarding alleged 
																																																								
121 L’amicus curiae dans l’rbitrage d’investissement, Florian Grisel; Jorge E. Vinuales, ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 22 Number 2 Fall 2007, p. 385. 
122 “The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings”, 
Dinah Shelton, The American Journal of International Law Volume 88:611, 1994, pp. 616-617.  
123 Ibid., p. 616. 
124 Ibid., p. 618; “The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and Tribunals”, Lance 
Bartholomeusz, Non-state Actors and International Law 5, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005, p. 211. 
125 Schwarzenberger (1986), p. 399. 
126 Ibid.  
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breaches of investment protection due to the adoption of new “green policy” regulations by 
the state where the investor has invested. 
 
Third party interventions have gained an especially strong foothold within human rights 
issues in connection with international institutes and courts such as the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human rights. To recognize the purpose of the amici curiae 
intervention mechanism within disputes that concern human rights is of importance, since 
the human rights aspect, in connection with environmentally important issues, explains the 
flared scope of the amicus curiae intervention even within international investment 
arbitration.127 It can be mentioned that third party briefs in front of the ECHR are poorly 
documented and that third party interventions before the ECHR have not been subject to 
much research. 128  Amicus curiae submissions are also possible before the dispute 
settlement method of the WTO Appellate Body, where mostly NGOs submit observations 
regarding issues such as health and the environment.129 The system before the WTO 
Appellate Body is a system quite unique and the Appellate Body has broad procedural 
authority. The application procedure likewise includes a consideration whether such a 
submission will help the tribunal in finding of the right conclusion.130  
 
The main task of a third party intervener is to provide the court with valuable information 
concerning the resolution of the case at hand, consisting of information that the tribunal 
could not otherwise acquire. Generally third party submissions can be presented by 																																																								
127 Even though investor-state disputes are solved through arbitration this mechanism was by some 
scholars nevertheless seen to look a lot like the procedures initiated before the ECHR, which is a 
public international tribunal applying public international law (see ”Nouvelles Perspectives pour 
l’arbitrage dans le contentieux économique intéressant les États”, Geneviève Burdeau, Revue de 
l’Arbitrage, Volume 1995 Issue 1, p. 16). It is therefor also of interest to examine the application of 
the amicus curiae-regime from this perspective. 
128 “An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights NGOs before the 
European Court of Human Rights”, Laura Van den Eynde, Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, Volume 31/3, 2013, p. 272. 
129 ”Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing”, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 2/01, Petros C. Mavroidis, First published in the Festschrift für Claus-Dieter E hlermann, 
editors Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis and Yves Meny, Kluwer, 2002, p. 1. See also 
the following address: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm (accessed 1 
October 2016). 
130 See the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, available at 
the following address: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#17 (accessed 1 
October 2016). 
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individuals, states, and governmental, non-governmental or intergovernmental 
organizations as well as by private companies.131 What is of importance is that the 
intervener should fulfil a certain degree of independency from both the parties and the 
tribunal itself, therefore the use of the term “third party” or “non-party” intervention.  
 
The intervener should first convince the tribunal that the information it is about to submit 
will be of value for the resolving of the dispute. In practice the intervener should in this 
connection submit an application to the tribunal for permission to actually file an amicus 
curiae submission. Secondly, the legal instruments accepting third party interventions also 
generally include the power for the tribunal to pose procedural guidelines, e.g., rules 
limiting time and length of the non-party submissions. Thirdly, the tribunal will, before 
granting leave, make sure that the submission will not unfairly prejudice any of the 
disputing parties in breach of the principle of equality.132 The principle of equality of the 
parties is a fundamental principle within investment arbitration (and within any judicial 
proceeding), and is often emphasized in connection with the tribunal’s deliberation 
whether or not to accept third party interventions.133 Taken cumulatively, these rules aim to 
ensure a smooth and productive regime of third party intervention without unfairly 
burdening any of the parties or hindering the proceeding. 
 
3.2. Amicus Curiae within International Investment Law 
In the following I explain according to which rules amicus curiae interventions are 
possible within investment arbitration and where the arbitral tribunal derives its power to 
accept such submissions. Thereafter I address the specific prerequisites set out in case law 
for accepting third party submissions. In setting up these prerequisites within the 
international law community, case law from investment tribunals is supplemented by legal 
literature and initiatives from the public society, and therefore these sources form part of 
the material researched. At the end of the chapter regarding amicus curiae, I address some 
																																																								
131 “L’amicus curiae dans l’arbitrage d’investissement”, Florian Grisel; Jorge E. Vinuales, ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 22 Number 2 Fall 2007, p. 430. 
132 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 58. 
133  Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 50; Dimsey 
(2015), p. 191. 
		 35	
recent and significant regulatory developments concerning the admission of amicus curiae 
application.    
 
3.2.1. The Lex Arbitri 
The answer whether or not there is a possibility to intervene as amicus curiae, is found in 
the underlying legal foundation of the dispute, the lex arbitri. We have to look whether the 
rules determining the conduct of the process give an opportunity to apply for amicus 
curiae intervention. Investment disputes concern alleged treaty breaches, and to find the 
lex arbitri the first place to look is, therefore, the treaty protecting the disputed investment 
in question and whether the said treaty makes reference to any arbitration rules. 
Concerning investment arbitration, procedural rules are found in, e.g., the ICSID 
Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the NAFTA, the arbitration rules of any 
arbitration institute, such as e.g. the arbitration rules of the SCC, the ICC or the LCIA. The 
NAFTA includes both provisions protecting free trade and investments, as well as its own 
procedural rules for dispute settlement.134 It is thereafter up to the parties to choose which 
of such relevant procedural rules are to be applicable to potential disputes, in case the 
investment protection instrument as such lacks its own procedural rules. 
 
Numerous IIAs and BITs make reference to the ICSID Convention135 as the procedural 
framework for resolving disputes about investment protection and today the ICSID 
Convention is the most frequently used procedural framework in investment arbitration.136 
As mentioned in chapter 2.4.2., the ICSID Convention differs from, e.g., the NAFTA and 
other BITs by not including any substantial investment protection provisions, but by only 
serving as a procedural framework, a sort of facility tool, for the settlement of investment 
arbitration. The ICSID Convention as such is a much used instrument for the procedural 																																																								
134 NAFTA Chapter 11 that establishes a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between 
signatories to the NAFTA.  
135 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States 1965. 
136 The NAFTA and the ECT make reference to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, amongst a variety of 
applicable rules to choose between, in case the both parties are parties to the ICSID Convention. 
The ECT also makes reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or even the arbitral rules of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. It is to be noted though that the ECT in the first place 
leaves it open to the parties to choose the set of procedural rules meaning that parties can likewise 
choose to rely on simply domestic proceedings or which ever, previously agreed, dispute settling 
procedure (article 26 (2) (a-b)). Regarding BITs making reference to the ICSID, see for instance 
Article 9 in the BIT between France and Albania signed, 13 June 1995, or Article 6 in the BIT 
between Sweden and Egypt, signed 15 July 1978. 
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execution of investment protection. For example, when the parties to an investment dispute 
have chosen, or when the investment agreement between them calls for the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, the lex arbitri is thus the ICSID Convention and the therein included 
Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Arbitration Rules thus become applicable if the parties have 
chosen to make reference to them in their mutual agreement.  
 
In case investment protection is established through a BIT between two states, or through a 
multilateral investment treaty between three or more states, it is consequently of relevance 
to look at what these treaties refer to in order to establish the lex arbitri. BITs are treaties 
including substantial investment protection provisions securing rights to foreign investors, 
and they rarely include any procedural rules. The substantial rules can only be secured with 
accompanying procedural rules and therefore BITs have to be supplemented with another 
set of rules. BITs can make reference to, e.g., the ICSID Convention, the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the ICC Arbitration Rules or the SCC Arbitration Rules, just to list some 
examples. Since, as we already know, the underlying principle is the freedom of choice, 
and therefore reference can basically be made to any other set of procedural rules that the 
parties wish to use.137  
 
3.2.2. The Power to Accept Amicus Curiae 
Formerly the power to accept third party interventions by the investment arbitration 
tribunal was derived from Article 44 in the ICSID Convention, which later on was subject 
to a reform in 2006. Along with the amendments, the powers of the tribunal were clarified. 
These clarifications and the other elements of the previous Article 44 are now contained in 
the new rules, Rule 37 (2) in the Arbitration Rules and Rule 41 (3) in the Additional 
Facility Arbitration Rules.  A similar empowerment is given in Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. As for NAFTA, the authority to accept third party 
submissions can be found in Chapter 11 and supported by a statement of the Free Trade 
Commission (FTC Statement), which will be discussed in more detail below.  																																																								
137 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 241. According to Article 24 (3) in the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty reference is made explicitly to the ICSID Convention and to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. Nevertheless the model BIT mentions the possibility for the parties to choose 
“any other arbitration institution or under any other arbitration rules”. In Article 1120 in Chapter 
11, the NAFTA makes reference to the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
The ECT again makes reference to both the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, as well as to the procedural rules of the SCC Arbitration Institute. 
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In 2006 both the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the ICSID AF Arbitration Rules were 
amended to include explicit provisions allowing third party interventions. The amendments 
were the result of codification of earlier practice before the ICSID.138 Since tribunals had 
already before the amended rules granted leave to petitioners to file amicus curiae 
submissions,139 there was an incentive to codify the practice of investment arbitration 
tribunals into legal norms. The amendments were also an expression of the explicit 
authority of the tribunal to accept such submissions and the desire to add clarity to the 
amicus curiae system.140  
 
Non-disputing party submissions are possible according to Rule 37 (2) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, which states as follows:  
“After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a 
party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non-disputing party”) to file a written 
submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In 
determining whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other 
things, the extent to which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the tribunal in the 
determination of the a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from 
that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of 
the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding 
 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the 
proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties 
are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party 
submission.” 
 
In case the parties are arbitrating under the ICSID Convention, the possibility for third 
party intervention is thus recognized and the tribunal may use this tool in order to arrive at 
the best possible decision.141 The tribunal can accept third party submissions after having 																																																								
138 Encompassing dispute resolution under the both the NAFTA and the ICSID rules. 
139 This was the case for instance in Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Order in response to petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 
May 2005. 
140 Dimsey (2015), p. 139. 
141 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del 
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consulted the parties, meaning that the parties should have the possibility to at least 
comment on the intervention of a third party.142 For instance in the Biwater case, the 
tribunal allowed the participation of amicus even after objections from one of the parties, 
strongly suggesting that an unanimous consent by the parties is not needed.143 In a situation 
where both parties object to the intervention, there may evidently be a strong implication 
that the amicus submission would not bring anything novel to the knowledge of the 
tribunal. In the Chevron case both the claimant and respondent objected to an amicus 
submission during the jurisdictional phase, arguing that the submission would not be 
helpful to the tribunal.144 Consequently, the tribunal took this into consideration when 
rejecting the third party submission on the basis that the amicus submission would not 
assist the court beyond the submissions made by the disputing parties.145 Nevertheless, 
Rule 37 (2) leaves the matter within the ample discretion of the tribunal, in that even 
though neither one of the parties have consented to a third party intervention, the tribunal 
can still accept such submissions provided that the prerequisites set forward in Rule 37 (2) 
are fulfilled.146 
 
Whether the tribunal is obliged to accept amicus applications that fulfil the prerequisites 
set out in Rule 37 (2) is a sensitive and quite problematic question, the answer to which 
seems to be in the negative. According to the wording in Rule 37 (2) “the Tribunal may 
allow” a non-disputing party to file an amicus submission. Additionally, the list of factors 
that the tribunal should weigh in the determination process is not exhaustive.147 Legal 
literature also strongly supports this view, and as stated by Working Group II, the tribunal 
has been given the role as a “gate-keeper” with regard to allowing third parties to 
																																																																																																																																																																							
Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Petition 
for Participation as Amicus Curiae, 17 March 2006, §. 11; Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Procedural order No. 2, 26 June 2012, §. 49; 
Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Procedural 
Order No. 5, 21 July 2016, §. 36. 
142 Dimsey (2015), p. 160-161. 
143 Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22. 
144 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 8, 18 April 2011, §§. 12-13.  
145 Ibid., §§. 18-20. 
146 Dimsey (2015), p. 164. 
147 Rule 37 (2) is written in a non-exhaustive manner: ”…, the Tribunal shall consider, among 
other things,…”  
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intervene.148 The answer is clearly that Rule 37 (2) does not pose an obligation on the 
tribunal and even if all the prerequisites set out in Rule 37 (2) for allowing an amicus 
submission are fulfilled, the tribunal can still within its discretion decide to reject such 
submissions.  
 
Additionally, the opinions set out in the amicus submission should address matters within 
the scope of the dispute, meaning that the substantive legal questions that the tribunal is 
facing should also be the subject addressed within the third party submission.149 As has 
been pointed out in legal literature, it would be rather difficult to picture a situation where 
an amicus would assist the court in arriving at the right conclusion regarding a matter 
which is not actually within the scope of the dispute.150 It is the task of the third party 
intervener to assure that its submission is limited to the subject matter of the dispute when 
applying for leave, but also the task of the tribunal to take this into consideration ex officio. 
In this connection it is important to underline that the submission of amicus should by no 
means broaden the subject matter of the case by adding to it elements that have not been 
initially challenged by the disputing parties. Instead it should assist the tribunal in finding a 
conclusion in the matter already put before it.  
 
The information provided by third parties is often aimed at, but not limited to, assist the 
tribunal in questions of law or of fact regarding the substantial matter of the dispute, in 
other words the substantial rights of investment protection conferred to an investor through 
an investment agreement.151 Even though it is more of the exception, the tribunal may as 
well accept amicus curiae interventions regarding the jurisdictional matter of the 
dispute.152 Nevertheless, arbitral tribunals seem to have divided views regarding the 																																																								
148 Dimsey (2015), pp. 133-134, 164; Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) 
on the work of its fifty-third session (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 and Add.1-4) in the UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, Volume XLII: 2011, p. 187. 
149 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 58; “Requirements for Amicus Curiae Participation in International 
Investment Arbitration – A Deconstruction of the Procedural Wall Erected in Joint ICSID Cases 
ARB/10/25 and ARB/10/15, Christian Schliemann, The Law and Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals 12, 2013, p. 374-375; Dimsey (2015), p. 164.  
150 “Civil Society’s Voice in International Economic Disputes, Brigitte Stern ICSID Review – 
Foreign Investment Law Journal, 2007 Volume 22 Issue 2, p. 341. 
151 “The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and Tribunals”, Lance Bartholomeusz, Non-
state Actors and International Law 5, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005, p. 280. 
152 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 71. 
For instance in the Pac Rim Cayman case the tribunal invited non-disputing parties to file 
		 40	
appropriateness of amicus submissions in the jurisdictional part. According to a restrictive 
interpretation of rule 37 (2) in the ICSID Arbitration Rules, jurisdictional matters can be 
excluded and it is not seen as appropriate to submit jurisdictional questions within the 
scope of amicus submissions. Whether or not jurisdictional claims will be approved will 
nevertheless depend on whether such submissions comply with the prerequisites 
established for allowing third party interventions.  
 
The ICISD AF Arbitration Rules, which is a set of procedural rules used for a facilitated 
arbitration, likewise include an identical provision explicitly allowing third party 
interventions.153 In the case of Piero Foresti,154 the tribunal granted amicus participation to 
two South-African NGOs and two international NGOs according to the 2006 ICSID AF 
Arbitration Rules.155 The tribunal also explicitly stated that the non-disputing parties 
should have access to the papers submitted by the parties in order for the amicus to focus 
on the specific issues at hand in the case and to see what position thereto the parties have 
taken. 
 
In investment arbitrations under the NAFTA, the acceptance of third party interventions 
follow the prerequisites given on 7 October 2003 in the Free Trade Commission statement 
on non-disputing party participation (FTC Statement). The FTC statement was given 
subsequently to the rendering of the awards in the cases of Methanex and UPS. The 
statement, which is a codification of practices before arbitral tribunals under the NAFTA, 
and that also takes some example from the mechanism of amicus curiae before the 
WTO,156 sets out detailed standards on third party participations. The FTC Statement is not 
legally binding on arbitral tribunals, but it has been largely relied upon in jurisprudence 
and other tribunals have found support therefrom. These two cases are also noteworthy 
																																																																																																																																																																							
submission limited to the jurisdictional questions excluding submissions concerning the merits, see 
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Procedural Order 
No. 8, 23 March 2011, §. (ii). 
153 Article 41 (3) ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, in force since 10 April 2006.  
154 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/01. 
155 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter Regarding Non-Disputing Parties, 5 October 2009. As amicus in the case 
were The Centre for Applied Legal Studies, The Legal Resources Centre, The Center for 
International Environmental Law (acted as amicus also in the cases of Methanex, Aguas Argentinas 
and Biwater) and The International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights 
156 Dimsey (2015), pp. 138-139. 
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since the proceedings where held in public, which is something the tribunal may allow 
subject to the consent of both disputing parties.157 
 
In the Glamis Gold case, a NAFTA arbitration governed by the 1976 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the tribunal accepted amicus submissions from the Quechan Indian 
Nation stating that the tribunal no longer has to assess whether article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules empowers it to accept non-party submissions, since the 
FTC Statement is an expression of the three NAFTA states (Canada, Mexico and the 
United States) accepting non-disputing party submissions.158 The same approach has been 
taken in connection with arbitration under the ICSID AF Arbitration Rules. In the Apotex 
case the standards in the FTC Statement were applied, as the tribunal held that article 41 
(3) of the ICSID AF Arbitration Rules does not pose an exhaustive list of criteria for 
accepting amicus submissions, but instead leaves the tribunal free to address “other things” 
in its determination.159 The tribunal also stated that the standards set out in article 41(3) 
and those of the FTC Statement are in conformity and that an application of the FTC 
Statement was therefore legitimate.160  
 
As we have seen, the development is evidently heading for a more tolerant approach 
towards amicus curiae participation within the drafting of new investment agreements and 
their adjoining arbitration. This is in contrast to what can be said about the standards for 
accepting third party interventions before. Today amicus curiae participation within 
investment arbitration has gained enough foothold foreseeing, through case law and legal 
literature, the establishment of certain patterns constituting the prerequisites and the legal 
standards for accepting amicus curiae interventions. These will be elaborated in the 
following. 
 
																																																								
157 The possibility to organize the proceedings open for the public is stated in Rule 32 (2) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
158 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on Application and 
Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, 16 September 2005, §. 9. 
159 Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Procedural Order on the Participation of the Applicant, BNM, as a Non-Disputing 
Party, 4 March 2013, §. 18. 
160Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Procedural Order on the Participation of the Applicant, BNM, as a Non-Disputing 
Party, 4 March 2013, §§. 18-19. 
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3.3. Prerequisites for Amicus Curiae Interventions 
In Aguas Argentinas,161 which is one of the first cases where amicus curiae submissions 
were allowed in accordance to the amended 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules, the tribunal set 
out three basic prerequisites to be fulfilled prior to the acceptance of an amicus brief.162 
The case concerned a 30 year concession right for water and wastewater services granted 
to the Argentine company AASA163. After ten years of operation, the claimants initiated 
proceedings against Argentina in 2003 claiming that Argentina had breached investment 
treaties through actions in violation of the prohibition of unlawful expropriation and the 
requirement of FET. Through such state actions, Argentine did not safeguard full 
protection and security to be provided to the investors, as afforded in the underlying BITs. 
The challenged state actions were part of a governmental regulatory reshaping program, 
following the difficult economical crisis that Argentina was suffering at the time. The case 
concerned the water distribution and sewage system in the city of Buenos Aires. 
Consequently the case also concerned environmental and human rights issues and the right 
of millions of people to basic public services. The Argentine state defended its actions by, 
i.e., referring to the demanding economical circumstances. The ICSID tribunal accepted 
amicus curiae submissions from five different NGOs,164 but at the same time denied the 
																																																								
161 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19. 
162 The first time the ICSID tribunal was in front of an amicus application was in 2003 during the 
case of Aguas del tunari v. The Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/03, in which the 
president of the tribunal, in a letter dated 29 January 2003 addressed to J. Martin Wagner, rejects 
the intervention of three NGOs on the basis that the tribunal does not have the authority to grant 
leave for the application to intervene. In the letter the president, David D. Caron, states, on behalf 
of the tribunal that “… it is the Tribunal’s unanimous opinion that your core requests are beyond 
the power of the authority of the Tribunal to grant. The interplay of the two treaties involved, …, 
and the consensual nature of arbitration places the control of the issues you raise with the parties, 
not the Tribunal. In particular it is manifestly clear to the tribunal that it does not, absent the 
agreement of the Parties, have the power to join a non-party to the proceedings; to provide access 
to hearings to non-parties and, a fortiori, to the public generally; or to make the document of the 
proceedings public.” In its rejection the tribunal did in other words rely on the fact that the parties 
to the dispute had not given their consent to the addition of a party to the dispute or the intervention 
of a non-party to the dispute.  
163 AASA was funded by foreign investors, including the claimants Suez, Vivendi Universal S.A., 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Anglian Water Group Ltd. 
164 The petitioners to file third party submissions were Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia 
(ACIJ), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL), Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción 
Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores.  
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petitioners request to access hearings and case material.165 The non-disputing parties 
motivated the intervention by the fact that the case affected fundamental environmental 
and human rights, which were in their scope of public interest. 
 
What makes the Aguas Argentinas case noteworthy is that the tribunal explicitly declared 
the special need to set out the criteria for the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions 
since lacked previous custom and clarity relative to the ICSID Convention on the question 
of third party interventions.166 What is nevertheless fairly unfortunate is that the tribunal 
seems to codify the characteristics for the appropriate circumstances to accept amicus 
curiae submissions from what has been established in previous international case law 
without making any explicit references. The Aguas Argentinas case can nevertheless be 
seen as a landmark case when examining the prerequisites for the acceptance of amicus 
curiae submissions within ICSID arbitrations.167 
 
The three basic criteria that the tribunal set out to consider were i) “the appropriateness of 
the subject matter of the case”, ii) “the suitability of a given non-party to act as amicus 
curiae in that case”, and iii) “the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and 
considered”.168 The tribunal reasoned that a wise application of these prerequisites would 
enable the tribunal to balance the rights and interests of non-disputing parties and 
simultaneously guarantee the substantive and procedural rights of the disputing parties. By 																																																								
165 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Order in response to petition for Transparency and 
Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 19 May 2005, §. 33. 
166 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 9. In the words of 
the tribunal: “This lack of specificity in the ICSID Convention and the Rules requires the Tribunal 
in this case to address two basic questions: 1) Does the Tribunal have the power to accept and 
consider amicus curiae submissions by nonparties to the case? and 2) If it has that power, what are 
the conditions under which it should exercise it?”. 
167 The tribunal has additionally referred to the decision on the participation of amicus curiae in the 
Aguas Argentinas case in a very identical request in the case of Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Aqua S.A v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in response to a petition for participation as Amicus Curiae, 17 
March 2006. In the latter case the tribunal mentioned that it had “established a process by which 
appropriate third parties might apply for and be granted leave to make amicus submissions to the 
Tribunal in that case”, and applied the same prerequisites established, see §. 4. 
168 For the sake of clarity this thesis will follow the same terminology categorising these three 
prerequisites as used by the tribunal in the relevant case. See Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to petition for Transparency and 
Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 17. 
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clarifying the legal foundation for third party submissions and by sensibly approving them, 
the tribunal would be able to find a sort of middle ground where it at the same time 
safeguards of the important procedural features to the benefit of the disputing parties and 
the right for the public to participate. In this case the tribunal declared fairness, 
effectiveness and promptness to be aspects that alongside the acceptance of  third party 
interventions should be respected.169   
 
3.3.1. The Appropriateness of the Subject Matter of the Case 
Within the test of appropriateness of the subject matter of the case, the nut to be cracked is 
whether the case involves matters of public interest. In the decision on the participation by 
third parties, the tribunal found in Aguas Argentinas that the subject matter at hand 
acquired the level of “public interest of such a nature that have traditionally led courts and 
other tribunals to receive amicus submissions from suitable non-parties.”170 Additionally 
the tribunal points out that a public interest has in these previous cases been seen to exist 
when the decision in such cases have potential, direct or indirect, effects on others than the 
disputing parties. 171  The tribunal thus makes reference to existing practice within 
international judicial proceedings where amicus curiae interventions have been accepted, 
but as mentioned without referring to any case law in specific. 
 
In Aguas Argentinas the tribunal mentioned that the case at hand includes questions of a 
particular public interest. This reasoning seems to suggest that there needs to be something 
more than simply a ‘public interest’ for the subject matter to be appropriate for third party 
interventions. It can nevertheless be argued whether the higher level of particularity was 
something that the tribunal wanted to set up as a general requirement. The tribunal noted 
that nearly all arbitrations resolved under the ICSID comprise a certain public interest, but 
it did not explicitly state that there has to be a particular public interest for amicus curiae 
submissions to be possible. Instead the tribunal simply makes reference to other 
international fora and the nature of public interest that in these cases have legitimized the 
																																																								
169 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 17. 
170 Ibid., §. 20. 
171 Ibid., §. 19. 
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acceptance of third party submissions. 172 Even though the tribunal neither addressed the 
notion of “particularity” in more detail nor whether it is a character that should be present 
for the prerequisite to be fulfilled, it specified that certain types of legal questions are by 
their nature of public interest and present in nearly every ICSID arbitration.173 It is 
therefore highly questionable whether the tribunal in the Aguas Argentinas case can be said 
to have instituted a requirement of a ‘particular public interest’, as has been put forward in 
some legal literature.174  Rather, what in this connection can be read out from the decision 
is that the required nature of public interest is depending on a bigger picture. 
 
Highly relevant is that in connection with the ‘public interest’ debate, the tribunal also 
stated that not only will the acceptance of third party submissions help the court in its task, 
but it will also contribute to a more accepting view by the public towards international 
investment arbitral processes through enhanced legitimacy, openness and transparency.175 
The tribunal also confirmed that the participation of potentially affected civil society 
representatives will contribute to a higher level of understanding by the public of the 
ICSID arbitration processes.176 This ICSID tribunal in other words acknowledged the need 
for an improved image of investment arbitration in order to be more accepted by the public 
society as a whole, as a mechanism to settle this type of disputes. Other arbitral tribunals 
had already earlier acknowledged the same. The NAFTA cases Methanex and UPS from 
2001, both under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, addressed, as mentioned above, 
the matter of enhanced legitimacy through added transparency.177  We here thus see a 																																																								
172 The tribunals does not enlighten the comparison by making reference to any specific case but 
simply refers to previous proceedings in the practices where the NAFTA has been used, in front of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the WTO (see Methanex Corporation v. United States 
of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as 
“amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §§. 32-33).  
173 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 19. 
174 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 58. 
175 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 22. 
176 Ibid. See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios 
Integrales del Aqua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in 
response to a petition for participation as Amicus Curiae, 17 March 2006, §. 21. 
177 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, § 49; United Parcel 
Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 70. 
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connection with the two arguments, public interest and legitimacy, that are discussed in 
chapter 4 below, regarding the underlying reasons for added transparency within 
investment arbitration. 
 
3.3.2. The Suitability of a Given Non-party to act as Amicus Curiae 
As for the second criteria, the test will be whether the non-party in question is actually 
suitable to act as an amicus curiae. In this connection the tribunal will test whether the 
intervener succeeds in convincing the tribunal that it has the experience, expertise and 
independence to actually be of help to the court.178 As mentioned, the fundamental idea 
behind the system of amicus curiae is that such submissions should in some way assist the 
court in its task of finding the correct decision. Therefore the intervener has to, already at 
an early stage, show the tribunal that it will actually provide added value to the resolution 
of the case. The burden of convincing the tribunal that it has solid reasons to accept amicus 
submissions is, naturally, left to the party wishing to intervene.179 The proof should 
generally encompass rather detailed information about the identity and background of the 
intervening party, enabling the tribunal to be convinced that the petitioner is experienced, 
beholds expertise and is independent.180 
 
The process of convincing the tribunal is initiated by, first, filing for leave through a 
separate application to act as amicus curiae. Secondly, the intervener should file a petition 
including relevant information about the intervener, the intervener’s interest in the case, 
the financial and/or material relationship between the intervener and the parties, as well as 
the reasons why the tribunal should accept the amicus curiae intervention. The tribunal 
will generally weigh the different factors taking also into account the remarks and 
comments of the disputing parties in order to come to a conclusion on whether the 
submission will actually help the tribunal. As noted the attempt is to find the perfect 																																																								
178 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 24; Are Amici 
Curiae The Proper Response to the Public’s concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?”, 
Alexis Mourre, The Law and Practice of International Tribunals, Volume 5 Issue 2, 2006, p. 269. 
179 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del 
Aqua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in response to a petition 
for participation as Amicus Curiae, 17 March 2006, §. 33. 
180 Ibid., §§. 30, 33; Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/15, Procedural order No. 2, 26 June 2012, §. 49; Dimsey (2015), pp. 164-165. 
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environment in which the rights of the non-party and the rights of the disputing parties can 
be balanced, so as not to unfairly burdening one of the parties and not hindering the 
efficiency of the process.  
 
It is here, when deciding on the suitability of a given non-party to intervene, where the 
arbitral tribunal’s vast margin of appreciation comes into play. Since rule 37 (2) in the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules does not provide for an exhaustive list of standards, the tribunal 
has broad possibilities to apply a versatile set of arguments in order to accept or decline the 
participation of amicus. The arguments that the tribunals have based their decisions on in 
creating these prerequisites will be addressed further below, however after looking into the 
procedural restrictions tribunals have set up for accepting an amicus to participate.   
 
The remarks of the disputing parties may be decisive, as in the Chevron case, but in the 
end it is, nevertheless, up to the tribunal to finally decide whether or not it will accept a 
third party intervention. In Chevron, which was conducted according to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules181 under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the tribunal 
declared that the intervention of the petitioners, one Ecuadorian NGO and one international 
NGO,182 would not help the court in its determination of the legal issues in the case.  The 
tribunal was in front of the task to determine questions that concerned the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, raised during the jurisdictional phase of the dispute, to which the amicus 
petitioners wished to express their viewpoints.183 Both the claimant and the respondent 
proposed that additional information would not bring anything novel to the tribunal’s 
knowledge and the tribunal therefore rejected the application offering a similar reasoning 
as the parties.184 
 
3.3.3. The Procedure by which the Amicus Submission is Made and Considered 
The third criterion will only become relevant if the two preceding prerequisites are 
fulfilled. The third criterion consists of the tribunal putting up certain procedural rules, 																																																								
181 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules from 1976. 
182 The third party interveners in the case were the Fundación Pachamam and the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. 
183 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 8, 18 April 2011, §§. 17-20.  
184 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 8, 18 April 2011, §. 18. 
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once it has granted leave for the intervener to file an amicus curiae submission. Alongside 
with acknowledging the importance of the amicus curiae institution as a transparency 
booster, tribunals have within jurisprudence likewise underlined the importance of the 
fairness and efficiency of the arbitral proceeding.185 The purpose of the procedural rules 
under which the amicus submission is to be made and considered imposed by the tribunal 
is to ensure that the arbitral process in itself is not burdened or disrupted by the third party 
submission.186 It is also important that neither of the parties is being unfairly prejudged by 
the amicus submission. As expressed by tribunal in Aguas Argentinas, the aim is to 
“enable an approved amicus curiae to present its views and at the same time to protect the 
substantive and procedural rights of the parties. In this latter context, the tribunal will 
endeavour to establish a procedure that will safeguard a due process and an equal treatment 
of the parties as well as the efficiency of the proceedings.”187 This means that an amicus 
petitioner passing the first filter and deemed to be a suitable non-party will nevertheless be 
put under certain procedural restrictions in order for the tribunal to ensure a fair and 
efficient proceeding. 
 
3.4. Justifications Behind Amicus Curiae   
In all of the three cases, Methanex, Aguas Argentinas and Biwater, the tribunal referred to 
the “transparency” argument. The tribunal in the Methanex case stated that the “arbitral 
process could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be 
harmed if seen as unduly secretive.”188 This approach was emphasized in the Aguas 
Argentinas case where the tribunal stated that “the acceptance of amicus curiae 
																																																								
185 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 69; 
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Procedural 
Order No. 8, 23 March 2011, §. (iv); Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of 
South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter Regarding Non-Disputing Parties, 5 October 
2009. 
186 Dimsey (2015), pp. 189-191. 
187 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 29. 
188 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from 
Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, UNCITRAL, 15 January 2001, §. 49. 
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submissions would have the additional desirable consequence of increasing the 
transparency of investor-state arbitration.189 
 
In the Biwater190 case the tribunal on the one hand, like in Aguas Argentina, confirms the 
statement made in Methanex that the “acceptance of amicus submissions would have the 
additional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency of investor-state 
arbitration",191 but on the other hand emphasized the somewhat restrictive approach of the 
tribunal towards the amicus curiae system in general. The tribunal points out in Biwater 
that to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process and to safeguard the expectations of the 
parties concerned, the reliance on amicus curiae submissions is accepted on an ad hoc 
basis and that the provisions allowing third party interventions (under the ICSID) should 
be interpreted narrowly.192 
 
As stated above, the core justification behind the amicus curiae system is that an objective 
viewpoint will help the court in its determination. In Biwater the tribunal came to the 
conclusion that “it may benefit from a written submission” by five different third party 
interveners.193 Furthermore, and quite importantly, the tribunal held that even if the 
Claimant would had showed that the claims alleged by the third party intervener were 
raised on matters originally and substantially not disputed by the parties, the amicus curiae 
intervention was accepted with support of the “transparency argument”.194 It is important 
to notice that the tribunal did not base its decision on the argument that the subject matter 
of the dispute, which in the case concerned human and environmental rights with regard of 
the privatisation of water and infrastructure services, touched upon issues of public interest 
but more or less on the argument that an acceptance of such a third party intervention 																																																								
189 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 22. 
190 Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22. In 
the award rendered in the Biwater case, the amicus curiae submission did have relatively much 
bearing in the final conclusion of the tribunal. 
191 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from 
Third Persons to Intervene as ”amici curiae”, UNCITRAL, 15 January 2001, §. 22; Biwater Gauff  
(Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order 
No. 5, 2 February 2007, §. 54. 
192 Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Procedural Order No. 5, 2 February 2007, §§. 46-47. 
193 Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Procedural Order No. 5, 2 February 2007, §. 50. 
194 Ibid., §. 55. 
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would foster transparency within investor-state arbitrations in echo with the words of the 
Methanex tribunal. Even though the tribunal stated that accepting such a submission would 
help it in its task of finding the right decision, this inherently strong application of the 
transparency leads one to hesitate on the bearing of the criteria that the matters raised by 
the amicus should be within the scope of the subject matter of the dispute.  
4 The Desire for Transparency in International Investment 
Arbitration 
Originally the need for transparency was something that the spokesmen for democracy 
pursued, but today the rule of transparency has become a somewhat generally accepted 
rule within investor-state arbitration.195 The view of some scholars in 2007 was that there 
was already clearly a distinction between commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration and that “transparency and accountability is starting to overweight privacy and 
confidentiality” in investment arbitration since states are involved and public issues are 
being settled.196 Even though the discussion of increased transparency is largely political 
and it can be questioned whether this change is supported by legal needs, it is a fact that 
the legal situation has significantly changed through recent initiatives and that the amicus 
curiae regime has obtained a new role.  
 
Today stakeholders have realized that transparency within international investment 
arbitration cannot be bypassed when the desire is to safeguard the future of investment 
arbitration. To secure the future of the international investment arbitration, the regime has 
to the public eye be seen as a legitimate means of resolving disputes, since sovereign states 
are involved. Added transparency could thus work as a quality stamp in this connection. In 
this chapter I address the issue of transparency and why we are talking about it in the first 
place, thereby providing a background for the discussion of the role of the EC as a possible 
enhancer of these desires. I will also review the stance of transparency as a public principle 
of international law. As an introduction to this chapter I will enlighten the discussion with 																																																								
195 Speaking for this argument are the various regulatory reforms that are being explained within 
this thesis. See also, e.g., “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement”, Meg Kinnear, Symposium Co-Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, 2005, p.10 
and Gehring; Euler (2015), pp. 9, 27. 
196 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 57. 
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some thoughts of practitioners from the Methanex case. 197 It is since this time that the 
notion of transparency within investor-state arbitration has gone through its early years, its 
struggle of being perceived sincerely and a period of relatively sluggish regulatory 
integration to finally gain the status of a public principle that will persist. 
 
In the Methanex case in 2001 the tribunal made some important remarks about the nature 
of investment disputes and the bolstering effect of added transparency by declaring that:  
"There is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues 
extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between 
commercial parties. This is not merely because one of the Disputing Parties is a 
State: there are of course disputes involving States which are of no greater general 
public interest than a dispute between private persons. The public interest in this 
arbitration arises from its subject matter, as powerfully suggested in the Petitions. 
There is also a broader argument, as suggested by the Respondents and Canada: 
the Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open 
or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, 
the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process 
in general and this arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do 
positive harm".198 
 
As mentioned earlier, an often occurring character of investment arbitration is that the 
matters that are being solved concern acts of sovereign states and encompass an analysis of 
national regulation, which is of interest to the public community. The subject matter in the 
Methanex case concerned allegations by the private investor, the methanol producing 
Methanex Corporation, that the acts of the state of California constituted discrimination 
against it as a foreign investor. The state of California implemented a policy to ban the use 
of MTBE as a gasoline additive, since it was considered to be hazardous with respect of 
the environment as well as people’s health and safety, when this additive, produced by 
Methanex, could come in contact with the drinking water. In this connection the tribunal 
stated that the subject matter of the case by character clearly is of public interest.  																																																								
197 Also in 2001, at the time of the Methanex case, the practice of investment treaty arbitration was 
heavily criticized in the media. The often-cited article in the New York Times summarises the 
public’s opinions on arbitration proceedings under the NAFTA to be secretive, over protecting the 
rights of private investors, unchallengeable and having policy changing consequences on 
government. See the full article, “Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle 
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say”, by Anthony DePalma, in The New York Times, 11 March 
2001, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-
obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 30 May 2016).  
198 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 49.  
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Already in the Methanex decision in 2001 the tribunal addressed the transparency issue 
through a twofold argument by reasoning that not only does the public interest call for 
openness, but also that the NAFTA “Chapter 11 arbitral process” 199  of investment 
arbitration would, through allowing third party submissions, to the public eye be perceived 
as more rightful, adding to it a quality stamp. In the following chapters I address these two 
key arguments, initially proposed by the Methanex tribunal, which have later on been 
prominent within the legal debate regarding the amicus curiae institution. Before studying 
these arguments I will briefly discuss which aspects of the arbitral process are within the 
scope of transparency and what can be said about the level of transparency today. 
 
4.1. What is Transparency? 
It should be kept in mind that two of the traditional characteristics owed to arbitration are 
privacy and confidentiality, which together with consensuality form the cornerstones of 
arbitration.200  These aspects contribute to the fact that stakeholders choose arbitration in 
the first place, instead of relying on public litigation in national courts. It is therefore also 
natural that users of arbitration services, parties, counsels and arbitrators, have and in the 
future will advocate for the preservation of privacy and confidentiality.201 Privacy and 																																																								
199 “Chapter 11 arbitral process” is often used as a term to simply describe an investor-state dispute 
initiated under the protection of investments granted by NAFTA. According to the websites of 
NAFTA, ” [c]hapter 11 establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes between 
investors and NAFTA partners. This process assures both equal non-discriminatory treatment 
among NAFTA investors (in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity) and due 
process before an impartial tribunal.”, http://www.naftanow.org/dispute/default_en.asp (accessed 
10 January 2016). 
200 See in particular chapters 2.2. and 2.3. 
201 This applies to both private investors as well as states. For example within the significant work 
and the surrounding discussions of the UNCITRAL of the implementation of transparency to 
investor-state arbitration and the drafting of the new Transparency Arbitration Rules, actors 
representing the private investors raised their voice for the conservation of confidentiality. 
Representing arbitrators the Milan Club of Arbitrators asserts their opinion for the preservation of 
confidentiality (see the statement by The Milan Club of Arbitrators in “Report of the Working 
Group II  (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its forty-eighth session” (New York, 4-8 
February 2008) (A/CN.9/646), in UNCITRAL Yearbook Volume XXXIX, 2008, p. 625). Later on 
in the working process The Russian federation stated that “when, within the UNCITRAL 
framework, a model law or some other instrument regulating questions relating to arbitration in 
connection with possible disputes between a State and a foreign investor is being developed, 
careful consideration should be given to the question of the advisability of replacing (or 
supplementing) the principle of confidentiality by the principle of transparency in investment 
dispute arbitration, in view of the importance of maintaining a balance between public and private 
interests.” and Turkey leaned to the same direction by pointing out that ”since the party autonomy 
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confidentiality within arbitration means that the procedure is conducted between the parties 
and the arbitral tribunal, and in the absence of the consent of both parties, without a third 
party having a say or even knowing what is going on in the arbitral proceeding.202 A 
separation is made between the notion of confidentiality and of privacy even if they 
overlap with each other.203 The confidentiality of an arbitral proceeding includes the 
protection of disclosure of case related information and material to third parties, 
safeguarding for instance the disclosure of commercially sensitive information.204 Privacy 
on the other hand encloses the protection of the actual access to the hearings and the 
arbitral proceedings, which, when they are held under total privacy are held in camera, 
meaning that only the disputing parties have access to the hearings and that only the 
disputing parties have knowledge of the ongoing dispute.205    
 
A completely opaque system would mean that information about ongoing cases, the 
hearings, case material (such as submissions by the parties) and final awards would never 
be made public. Total privacy and confidentiality would in other words mean that no one 
will know who the parties to a dispute are and what the dispute concerns, not to mention 
the outcome in the dispute. As arbitration is characterised by consensuality, the starting 
point for both commercial and investment arbitration is that the consent of the parties is 
needed for the publication of any case material.206 The practice within ICSID arbitration is 
nevertheless that at least the basic information concerning an ongoing case is published. In 
addition, as part of the reform of the rules in 2006, rule 48 (4) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules provides that excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tribunal in the award shall be 
																																																																																																																																																																							
is a prevailing rule in arbitral proceedings, these issues (publicity and transparency) should be 
determined in accordance with the common consent of the parties.” (see ”Note by the Secretariat 
on settlement of commercial disputes: Transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration - 
Compilation of comments by Governments, submitted to the Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on its fifty-third session” (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 and Add.1-4) in the UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, Volume XLII: 2011, pp. 233, 236.  
202 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 57; De Brabandere (2015), pp. 149-150; Blackaby et al. (2015), §§. 
2.161-2.163. 
203 ”Misplaced Confidence? An Analysis of Privacy and Confidentiality in Contemporary 
International Arbitration, James Hargrove, Dispute Resolution International, Volume 3 Number 1 
March 2009, pp. 47-48; De Brabandere (2015), p. 149. 
204 Born (2014), p. 2782; De Brabandere (2015), p. 149.   
205 Ibid. 
206 McLachlan et al. (2007), p. 57; De Brebandere (2015), p. 148; Rule 48 in the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules.  
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published even in the absence of the parties’ consent.207 Total privacy might be the case for 
commercial arbitration, but not to the same extent with regard of investment arbitration, at 
least when the dispute is resolved under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
 
The other extreme, a totally open arbitration procedure, would naturally resemble that of a 
public judicial process conducted in a domestic court. In its culmination a totally 
transparent proceeding means that also non-disputing parties would have (i) accurate and 
up to date knowledge about ongoing cases, (ii) open access to case material, such as 
written submissions by the parties including their argumentation, (iii) access to hearings 
that would be open for the public and (iii) access to rendered awards in its totality, 
including the legal reasoning made by the tribunal.  
 
In contrast to commercial arbitration and according to what has been described in chapter 
2.3., investment arbitration encompasses matters of public international law that generate 
public interest. These public matters are then resolved through a private dispute settlement 
tool. It has therefore frequently been put forward that investment arbitration presents a 
hybrid and sui generis form of dispute settlement and that the values and rights, such as 
confidentiality and privacy that traditionally characterize arbitration, cannot to the same 
extent be granted to investment arbitration as to classic commercial arbitration.208 The 
possibility to open up the procedural phases to the public and to grant investor-state 
arbitration more transparency lies in the fact that there does not exist a principle or an 
obligation of confidentiality within investment arbitration.209 In practice we can distinguish 
																																																								
207 From only giving a possibility to the tribunal of the publication of excerpts of the legal 
conclusions, the change in the Arbitration Rules in 2006 included that the tribunal would according 
to the new rules have an obligation to publish such excerpts. A same reform was made to the 
Additional Facility Arbitration Rules; see: Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations 
(2005), p. 9.   
208 “L’amicus curiae dans l’arbitrage d’investissement”, Florian Grisel; Jorge E. Vinuales, ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 22 Number 2 Fall 2007, p. 383; De 
Brabandere (2015), p. 24.   
209 S.D. Myers, Inc. V. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 16 (concerning 
confidentiality in materials produced in the arbitration), 13 May 2000, §. 8; ”Transparency and 
Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Meg Kinnear, Symposium Co-
Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, 2005, p. 4; De Brabandere (2015), p. 148. Regarding 
arbitrations according to the NAFTA, see in particular the Free Trade Commissions interpretations 
of Chapter 11 in the NAFTA from 2001(available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf, accessed 31 July 2016), in which it is 
stated that “[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing 
parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and subject to the application of Article 1137(4), nothing 
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three main procedural categories to which added transparency pertains and that throughout 
the evolution of investor-state arbitration have been developed to become more accessible 
for the public.210 These three categories are comprised of (i) the access by the public to 
information about existing arbitral proceedings and to obtain information and documents 
submitted within the proceedings, (ii) the right to be present at the arbitral proceedings 
(hearings) and (iii) the right to obtain final awards. Even though this research focuses on 
the possibility to intervene as an amicus curiae, the scope of transparency is relevant to 
explain, as these third party submissions naturally are dependent on the information about 
ongoing arbitration and the access to case material submitted by the parties.   
 
4.2. The Need for Transparency 
As seen above the Methanex tribunal offered two arguments in support of the acceptance 
of amicus to intervene. These arguments that have since been present in the defence for 
added transparency establish the logic behind, what I call, the modern amicus curiae 
institution. 211  I will now address these arguments. The main arguments supporting 
enhanced transparency are (i) that a certain public interest is inherent for investor-state 
arbitration and (ii) that broader transparency enhances the legitimacy of the investment 
arbitration regime. Without going too much into the political discussion, the focus is on the 
developments the amicus curiae institution has seen recently. The discussion here will 
support and enable the understanding of the findings later on concerning the procedure of 
admitting the EC to participate as a third party-intervener.  
 
The notion of transparency poses some contradictions since traditional commercial 
arbitration is characterized as confidential, private and adhering to the principle of party 
autonomy. Such features do not seem to fit with notions such as transparency, publication 																																																																																																																																																																							
in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, or 
issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal.”  
210 Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (2005), p. 3; “Transparency and Third 
Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Meg Kinnear, Symposium Co-Organised 
by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, 2005, pp. 3-4. 
211 Regarding the argumentation in support for legitimacy and transparency see for instance: Report 
of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its fifty-third session 
(A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 and Add.1-4) in the UNCITRAL Yearbook, Volume XLII: 2011, pp. 186-
187 (in which alongside the legitimacy argument the usefulness of the amicus curiae-institution 
was underlined); “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement”, Meg Kinnear, Symposium Co-Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD, 2005; 
Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (2005). 
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of procedural documents and tribunals having the power to accept third party interventions. 
To explain the need for transparency within investment arbitration we have to primarily, 
here again, underline the difference between investment arbitration and traditional 
commercial arbitration. Investment arbitration cannot be seen as a wholly private method 
of resolving disputes, but more of a hybrid institution sharing features from both private 
and public areas of law. Even though the hybridity of investor-state arbitration has been 
put forward by scholars,212 many arbitration institutes nevertheless provide for application 
of the same arbitration rules regardless of whether the disputes are classified as 
commercial arbitration or investment arbitration.213 This fact is an indication that the 
classification of investment arbitration as a public dispute resolution process, or at least as 
a melange of public and private, still needs to be seriously taken into account within the 
procedural legal framework of investment arbitration. 
 
4.2.1. The Public Interest Argument 
As was stated by the Methanex tribunal, investment arbitrations are characterised with a 
public interest.214 A vast majority of the alleged breaches of investment protection come 
from state acts exercised within its power to regulate. It is quite common that a newly 
adopted state policy or a regulatory act aiming at fulfilling new improvements within a 
state, whether it concerns, e.g., national health, environmental issues, sustainable 
development or human rights, is targeted by a foreign investor causing a less profitable 
atmosphere. This in turn means that issues resolved within investment arbitration target 
fundamental notions of state sovereignty, such as the right to regulate.215 At the same time 
these state policies and regulatory matters that are being examined by arbitral tribunals also 
affect the people living within the jurisdiction of the state subject to the arbitration. The 
impact of the arbitral process thus expands beyond the disputing parties and, consequently 
																																																								
212 “L’amicus curiae dans l’arbitrage d’investissement”, Florian Grisel; Jorge E. Vinuales, ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 22 Number 2 Fall 2007, p. 383; De 
Brabandere (2015), p. 24.   
213 For example the much used arbitral institution within investment arbitrations, the SCC, provides 
for only one set of rules, likewise the ICC International Arbitration Court can hear investor-state 
disputes under the ICC Rules also applicable on commercial disputes, even though in comparison 
to the SCC the ICC does not publish its case-load statistics and therefore the scope of its use within 
investor-state arbitrations impossible to define.  
214 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 49. 
215 Brownlie (1979), p. 60. 
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there exists an increased level of sensitivity and a higher demand of public interest for 
participation in the disputes.  
 
There are many cases in which the investor has attacked the regulatory acts by states and 
their newly adopted policies where the underlying regulatory changes aim to enhance the 
overall public welfare of the people within their respective jurisdiction, in terms of health, 
security, human rights or environmental aspects. One good example is the quite recent 
Vattenfall case216 where the German state executed a new policy with the goal of reducing 
or potentially eliminating the use of nuclear power. It is obvious that the issues in dispute 
in the Vattenfall case concerned matters that affect the entire nation and the people living 
in Germany. Another case that has caught much media attention is the case of Philip 
Morris v. Australia217 and Philip Morris v. Uruguay218 where the relevant governments 
posed new restrictions against the contents of cigarette packaging, in an effort to reduce the 
willingness to buy cigarettes. In both cases the claimants argued that due to these 
regulatory changes, the respondent state had committed a breach of investment protection 
and that the claimants therefore had suffered losses in their investments.219  
 
As such matters are being resolved by investment tribunals, the issue that has generated 
concerns is that investment arbitration is often conducted behind closed doors, making 
information about cases hard to find. Even though the ICSID Arbitration Rules or the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include provisions obliging the arbitration to take 
place in camera, the parties can naturally so choose by their own initiative.220 Fortunately 
it is hardly ever the case that investor-state arbitration would occur totally in the dark when 
the arbitration is taking place under the ICSID, since the ICSID has a common policy to 
																																																								
216 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG. v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6.  
217 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-12. 
218 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7. 
219 In the case against Australia the tribunal did not try the case on the merits but rendered a 
decision where it held that due to jurisdictional matters the initiation of an investor-state dispute 
was an abuse of right or abuse of process (see Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 17 
December 2015) and in the case against Uruguay the tribunal upheld the respondent states defence 
and did not agree that these state acts constituted illegal expropriation or a denial of faire and 
equitable treatment as argued by the claimant (see Award of 8 July 2016). 
220 Rule 32 in the ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 28 in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
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publish at least some information about ongoing disputes.221 The situation is different 
when an investor-state arbitration is held within one of the institutional arbitration centres, 
like the SCC. The SCC solved 12 investment disputes in 2015 from a total of 85 
investment disputes since 1993.222 Of these 85 investor-state disputes the SCC published 
none on the website of the SCC. The confidentiality of the arbitral hearings is safeguarded 
in article 27.3 of the SCC Arbitration Rules, whereas the arbitration and its award are 
protected from disclosure in article 46.  
 
The intention is not to claim that states when implementing new policies always act in 
bona fide and that such acts could not constitute scape goats for an underlying bad 
treatment of a foreign investor, but instead that such allegations raise questions with far 
reaching impacts, making it well founded that the public can get its voice herd.223 It is also 
not argued that only investment arbitration raise issues of public interest. Commercial 
arbitration too can have huge impacts on other non-disputing parties, and investment 
arbitration can lack this feature in some cases. But since sensitive issues are often under 
examination within investment arbitration, the public interest argument has gained 
prominence within the transparency debate. 
 
Amicus curiae interventions will enable interested third parties to submit opinions in front 
of the tribunal in matters of public interest. The participation of an amicus will bring to the 
attention of the tribunal important aspects on matters such as human rights, sustainable 
development and environmental issues,224 as such interested organizations are experts in 
their respective areas. As put by Born, it holds true that a purely commercial dispute can as 
well have a greater impact spanning over the public society than simply on the disputing 
parties, and that likewise an investment dispute can concern a matter raising no public 
																																																								
221 Bianco (2015), p. 66. 
222 Statistics over the investment disputes concluded within the SCC are available here: 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/statistics/investment-disputes-2015/ (accessed 31 July 2016).   
223 There can be said to exist public interest also when looking from the other perspective, namely, 
in the case when a state actually has acted in breach of an investment treaty and being held liable 
for its acts. When in breach and condemning award can include quite large amounts of 
compensation to be paid to the private investor by the state and in turn this affects the tax-payers of 
that state. 
224 ”Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw 
the Line Favorably for the Public Interest”, Katia Fach Gómez, Fordham international Law Journal, 
Volume 35, 2012, p. 452. 
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interest.225 Born also points out that nothing in the nature of investor-state arbitration 
should legitimate a blanket refusal of confidentiality for such proceedings and the 
application of a general principle of transparency should be opposed.226 Nevertheless, it is 
precisely an application of total confidentiality over such disputes that have caused worried 
reactions from the civil society, as the need to have public voices heard and arguments of 
public interest issued is well-founded. In order to tone down the point raised, it has to be 
remembered that the “public interest” argument is merely an argument and is often also a 
political one. It is therefore questionable whether the presence of the amicus actually 
brings more value to the resolving of the dispute from a legal point of view.     
 
4.2.2. The Legitimacy Argument  
We now turn to a more general viewpoint over investment arbitration and to what the 
Methanex tribunal stated about the perception of investor-state arbitration. 227  The 
perception of legitimacy is lacking within international investment arbitration and there is 
said to be a “legitimacy crisis”.228 As put by investment tribunal as we have seen before, a 
strengthened role of amicus curiae could in different ways attempt to fix some of these 
flaws. 229 There are two main problems that seem to tear upon the legitimacy of investment 
																																																								
225 Born (2014), p. 2829. 
226 Ibid., pp. 2828-2829. 
227 See footnotes 191 and 198. 
228 ”L'entrée de la société civile dans l'arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur”, Brigitte Stern, Revue de 
l’Arbitrage Volume 2002 Issue 2, pp. 331-332; Blackaby; Richard (2010), pp. 268-269; Reforming 
International Investment Governance (2015), p. 128.  
229 In general about transparency see: Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) 
on the work of its fifty-third session (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 and Add.1-4) in the UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, Volume XLII: 2011, p. 181), in which is it expressed that “[i]n addition to the broader 
objective of promoting sustainable development through international investment law, ensuring 
transparency and meaningful opportunity for public participation in treaty-based investor-State 
arbitration was said to constitute a means to promote the rule of law, good governance, due 
process, fairness, equity and rights to access information. It was also seen as an important step to 
respond to the increasing challenges regarding the legitimacy of international investment law and 
arbitration as such. Those challenges were said to include, among others: an increasing number of 
treaty-based investor-State arbitrations, including an increasing number of frivolous claims; 
increasing amounts of awarded damages; increasing inconsistency of awards and concerns about 
lack of predictability and legal stability; and uncertainties regarding how the investor-State dispute 
settlement system interacted with important public policy considerations. It was said that legal 
standards on increased transparency would enhance the public understanding of the process and its 
overall credibility. Furthermore, as put by scholars Nigel Blackaby and Caroline Richard ”[t]he 
admission of these [third party-] briefs was justified on the basis that they assist tribunals by 
providing them with perspectives and expertise different from those provided by the parties, they 
increase transparency in investment arbitration by providing the public with insight into the 
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arbitration. The first problem is that the investment arbitration system does not completely 
adhere to the rule of law, while the second problem arises from the seemingly endless 
questions caused by the fragmentation of international law.  
 
International investment arbitration has caught itself in the crossfire between private and 
public dispute settlement, causing a dilemma with regard of the rule of law. The issue 
relates to the nature of arbitration as a private dispute settling mechanism, in which the 
principle of party autonomy is followed and the dilemma arises since matters of great 
public interest are solved through such methods. Since the parties in arbitration are free to 
choose the seat of the tribunal as well as the composition of the tribunal,230 every arbitral 
proceeding is different and established ad hoc, i.e., explicitly for the specific case at hand. 
There has therefore not been a clear development of coherent jurisprudence within 
investment arbitration. What additionally has aggravated this problem is that the decision-
making by the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the principle of stare decisis. 231 In other 
words the arbitral tribunal has no obligation to follow precedents established in earlier case 
law by other tribunals. These issues are highlighted when the procedural material and the 
rendered arbitration awards concerning disputes of public interest are not made available to 
the public, making the conduct of the arbitration impossible to scrutinize. 
  
The legitimacy of investment arbitration is also burdened by the complex issue of 
fragmentation of international law and it can be seen that investment arbitration is an 
illegitimate means to administer global governance. The fragmentation of international law 
was already predicted in the 1970s by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. The 
prediction was that “global law” would go through a fragmentation on the level of social 
																																																																																																																																																																							
investment arbitration process, and they cure the democratic deficit by fostering public 
participation in the decision-making process.”, see also Blackaby; Richard (2010), pp. 253-254. 
230 The parties are generally free to appoint arbitrators according to their needs and often in order to 
match the specific needs of expertise posed by the subject matter of the dispute with the proper 
arbitrators. 
231 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 33. Non-reliance on previous case law has explicitly been pointed 
out in the following cases: Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 
2001, §. 51; AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005, §§. 17-33; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, §. 39.  
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regimes.232 Another timely spokesman regarding the fragmentation of international law is 
Martti Koskenniemi, Professor in International Law, who has lead a study explicitly 
focused on this subject in 2006.233 Koskenniemi’s central views regarding fragmentation of 
international law, caused by globalization, is that various specialized areas of law are 
shaped in their own self-contained systems, in which independent principles and 
institutions are developed without regard to surrounding legal developments and values. 
This leads to what Koskenniemi calls a “loss of an overall perspective of the law”.234 
Koskenniemi has also contributed to the discussion in particular regarding the legitimacy 
of international investment arbitration with numerous points of view, amongst which one is 
that the collisions of regimes has surfaced through investment arbitration. 235  The 
discussion of the fragmentation of international law would serve as a separate thesis, and 
except fore some concluding remarks, I will not address this question further here.  
 
4.3. The “Modern” Amicus Curiae 
“No modern rules of investor-State arbitration procedure would be complete without the 
possibility of allowing submissions by third persons”, is the first sentence in the 
introduction to “Article 4. Submission by a third person”, by Mariel Dimsey in a work 
regarding the new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.236 This chapter discusses the 
position of transparency as a public principle within investment law and the strong status 
that amicus curiae has gained. Further I look at how transparency today takes an evolved 
role creating, what I call the modern amicus curiae. The amicus curiae institution has gone 
through some noteworthy developments, serving initially as a tool within international 
tribunals to gather facts otherwise left outside the knowledge of the court and later 																																																								
232 “Regime-Collisions: The Vein Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano; Gunther Teubner, Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 
25:999 Summer 2004, pp. 999-1000. 
233 See “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law”, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, International Law Commission, Fifty-eight session, Geneva 
2006, United Nations (UN doc. A/CN.4/L.682). 
234 Ibid., p. 11. 
235 See, e.g., in particular his participation in the Helsinki Summer Seminar in 2014 held at the 
University of Helsinki by the Erick Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights with 
the title “International Investment Law: Between Public and Private”, where Koskenniemi lectured 
about the fragmentation of international law by specifically addressing the regime collision 
between the law of human rights and trade and investment law, which according to Koskenniemi is 
an extreme type of fragmentation. 
236 Dimsey (2015), p. 129. 
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additionally becoming a channel for the echo of the public voice. In the modern amicus 
curiae these rights of the civil society are shadowing those of the disputing parties.  
 
An international custom could be defined as a somewhat generally accepted manner of 
conduct between sovereign states in their relations inter se, to the extent that it can be 
regarded as law. 237  International custom is an important source of law within the 
international law-making sphere, since there exists no regulatory body that could impose 
legally binding instruments upon all states. Custom therefore likewise plays an important 
role within international investment law and therefore the nature of amicus curiae is 
approached from a practical point of view.238 The case law discussed earlier is therefore of 
relevance to prove the strong role that transparency has been given. 
 
The codification of such case law can bee seen for instance within the ICSID. ICSID 
being, according to its own words the “premier international investment arbitration facility 
in the world”,239 has already before the reformed Arbitration Rules in 2006 recognized the 
importance of public understanding of investment law an investment arbitration, and 
continues on an ongoing basis to propose an outreach to enhance such factors.240 Even 
though idea behind the amicus curiae institution as an enhancer of legitimacy derives from 
political motivations it has de facto resulted in significant regulatory changes recently.241 
As a result the status of transparency within investment arbitration is stronger than it ever 
has been,242 forming a subtle growing ground for the modern amicus curiae.  																																																								
237 Brownlie (1979), pp. 6-8. 
238 L’amicus curiae dans l’arbitrage d’investissement”, Florian Grisel; Jorge E. Vinuales, ICSID 
Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 22 Number 2 Fall 2007, p. 413. 
239 ICSID Annual Report 2015, p. 5. 
240 Ibid., p. 51. 
241 The desire for more transparency has been codified through the NAFTA FC Statement in 2003, 
following the revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules in 2006 implementing the same principles as 
in the NAFTA FC Statement, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules from 2013 adding a provision 
for the enhancement of transparency to the 2010 rules, the free trade agreement between Canada 
and the EU, CETA, which makes reference to the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and the United 
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-state Arbitration (Mauritius 
Convention) that extends the scope of application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules as well 
as the revision of the SIAC Arbitration Rules that aim to implement transparency through enabling 
third party participation in their new investment arbitration rules. 
242 With the new UNCITRAL Transparency Rules the regulatory base for transparency clauses 
within investment arbitration is as it’s highest as present, in addition to new rules being 
implemented and revised in other arbitration centres as for example in the SIAC. See also for 
instance an announcement in January 2015 by the European Commission to contribute with 
100 000 € to the UN secretariat, for the administration of a public registry, established in the wave 
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There has been a lot of discussion about transparency becoming a public principle in 
investment arbitration and thus for amicus curiae becoming universally applicable as a key 
element of transparency.243  Examples of this are the new initiatives within various 
regulatory frameworks, such as the new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor State Arbitration from 2013 (UNCITRAL Transparency Rules), which are 
the result of a long revision process by UNCITRAL Working group II commenced in 
2010. Article 4 of these rules gives the explicit power to the arbitral tribunal to accept third 
party submissions. This can be illustrated by citing Dimsey as being “the most recent step 
in a long, slowly developing trend of increased acceptance of third person participation in 
investor-State arbitral proceedings” and forms another effort to codify best practices from 
other legal instruments and previous jurisprudence in the area.244   
 
Some scholars suggest that transparency should indeed be regarded as a general principle 
within investment law, arguing that the benefits of a more transparent system outweighs a 
strict application of confidentiality.245 On the other hand, some scholars oppose this view, 
as discussed above.246 Even though the views in legal literature on whether or not 
transparency should be considered as a general principle within investment law are 
evidently still split, it cannot be ignored that the amicus curiae institution, hand in hand 
with the development and incorporation of transparency, has de facto been reshaped 
considerably. 																																																																																																																																																																							
of the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, comprising information and decisions about 
investor-state disputes. The press release is available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1428 (accessed 11 June 2016) and the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Registry is found on the following address: 
http://www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/registry/index.jspx (accessed 11 June 2016).  
243 See for instance the following academic contributions supporting the argument that the amicus 
curiae-institution has become mature and that regulation allowing amicus curiae-interventions 
should be taken seriously and not simply as recommendations: “Extension of Proceedings Beyond 
the Original Parties: Non-Disputing Party Participation in Investment Arbitration”, Eloïse Obadia, 
ICSID Review, Volume 22 Issue 2 Fall 2007, pp. 350-351; “Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae 
in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest”, 
Katia Fach Gómez, Fordham international Law Journal, Volume 35, 2012, pp. 546-548; 
“Requirements for Amicus Curiae Participation in International Investment Arbitration – A 
Deconstruction of the Procedural Wall Erected in Joint ICSID Cases ARB/10/25 and ARB/10/15”, 
Christian Schliemann, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 12, 2013, pp. 
366-367, 388-390.  
244 Dimsey (2015), p. 131. 
245 “The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration”, Cindy 
G. Buys, The American Review of International Arbitration, Volume 14, 2003, p. 121.  
246 Born (2014), pp. 2828-2829. 
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Two arguments were elaborated above, that a certain public interest is often prominent in 
investment arbitration and that in order to safeguard the legitimacy of the investment 
arbitration mechanism added transparency is indispensible. These evidently recognized 
and well-founded arguments promote transparency and convey the incorporation of 
procedural rules, such as the amicus curiae right, to international investment law. To 
summarize it can be argued that transparency has become a public principle within 
international law and applies to matters of public interest. Even though investment 
arbitration originates from a dispute settling method that was designed for private 
purposes, this should not be a factor that hinders the reclassification of investment 
arbitration, thereby giving more room for adaptation and modernization. When making a 
proper classification of investment arbitration, placing it in its pertinent category of public 
international law, the same principles applies as for other matters of public international 
law in general. Transparency will thus become generally applicable also with regard to 
investment arbitration and thereby also the application of amicus curiae. 
 
It has also been noted that the amicus curiae institution is an efficient remedy to repair 
flaws in the public perception of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, which 
presupposes a more limited use of the principle of confidentiality. It is already a fact that 
confidentiality has had to bow within investment arbitration and instead creating more 
room for transparency. The point that Born puts forward seems therefore already 
outdated, 247  since this line has already been bypassed; the modern amicus curiae-
institution is here to stay as a messenger for transparency.  
 
4.1. Recent Transparency Initiatives  
As yet another proof of the principal standing of transparency in investment arbitration is 
the novel endeavour of the UNCITRAL to introduce a model legal framework including 
rules for more open investor-state arbitration in the “new” revised rules from 2013. 
Nevertheless, since the rules are relatively fresh, the question still remains whether the 
rules actually will change the scene or whether they become a legal instrument of which 
the goals only remain at an illusory level.   
 																																																								
247 See footnotes 225 and 226. 
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The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules today come in three different versions; the original 
rules from 1976, the revised rules from 2010 and the “new” revised rules from 2013. 
Article 1 paragraph 4 of the new UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules from 2013 incorporates 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration248 (the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules), which like the new Arbitration Rules also came into 
effect 1 April 2014. The new rules from 2013 are as such the same as the previous rules 
with the addition of a specific inclusion of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and with 
the aim of clarifying the application of these. The main goal of the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules is to enhance transparency within investor-state arbitration and they 
are a result of nearly three years of negotiations by the Working Group II on Arbitration 
and Conciliation. The reformed rules are a ground breaking step towards a more open 
institution of investor-state arbitration by taking into account the interests of the public in a 
more formal and official way. Article 4 in the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules explicitly 
confirms that investment tribunals can accept amicus curiae submissions. The article also 
describes in detail under what conditions third-party submissions can be accepted. 
 
As noted above, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are often pointed out as the relevant 
procedural rules for the conduct of investor-state arbitrations and the Transparency Rules 
will apply to the agreements referring to these rules that have been entered into as of 1 
April 2014. Alternatively, the Transparency Rules will be applicable in the case the 
agreement is concluded earlier than 1 April 2014 if the parties have explicitly “opted in” 
for the use of these new rules.249 The first case where the Transparency Rules are applied is 
the pending Iberdrola v. Bolivia case conducted under the auspices of the PCA.250 Another 
recent case applying the Transparency Rules is the ICSID case BSG Resources Limited v. 																																																								
248 Article 1 paragraph 4 states: “For investor-State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty 
providing for the protection of investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty- based Investor-State Arbitration (“Rules on Transparency”), subject to 
article 1 of the Rules on Transparency.”  
249 Mauritius Convention, adopted 10 December 2014 with a signing ceremony opened 17 March 
2015 in Port Louis, Mauritius, is an instrument aiming at the facilitation of states to agree upon the 
usage of the Transparency Rules, though it has not yet come into force. The idea with the 
Convention is that upon signature the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules will even be applicable on 
disputes arising out of already existing investment treaties between states (i.e treaties that are 
signed before 1 April 2014, thus before the 2013 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules came into effect), 
independent of the arbitration rules applicable to the investment protection dispute. According to 
article 7 (1), the Convention is up for signature for ”any (a) state; or (b) regional economic 
integration organization that is constituted by States and is a contracting party to an investment 
treaty”, this thus including e.g. the EU. 
250 Iberdrola, S.A. and Iberdrola Energia. S.A.U. v. Bolivia (PCA Case No. 2015-05). 
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Republic of Guinea.251 Even though the amended UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 
Transparency Rules are steps towards from transparency point of view there are still some 
speed bumps in the way of an efficient application of the Transparency Rules since states 
are allowed to make reservations to the application of these rules.252 
 
In addition to the new UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule, another example that can be 
mentioned is the draft investment arbitration rules of the Singapore International 
Arbitration Center (SIAC Draft IA Rules),253 which aim at addressing timely matters and 
at providing for a modern set of arbitration rules applicable to investor-state.254 Rule 28.2 
in the SIAC Draft IA Rules address amicus curiae submissions. The rules look very much 
like the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules when it comes 
to third party submissions with the exception that instead of “significant interest” the term 
“sufficient interest” is used for the determination of whether or not the tribunal should 
allow third party submissions. It would in other words suffice for an amicus wishing to 
intervene to have a “sufficient interest” in the arbitration under the application of the SIAC 
Draft IA Rules. Consequently the threshold to accept third party submissions would be 
lowered. What is also novel about the SIAC Draft IA Rules is that they are a truly hybrid 
set of rules, since the rules for investment arbitrations would be separate from the rules for 
commercial arbitrations, which is not the case in many other arbitration centres. The idea 
behind the SIAC Draft IA Rules take into account the particular character and special 
needs of investment arbitration and they provide as a practical example of how the 
distinction between commercial arbitration and investment arbitration, including the desire 
for greater transparency, is taken into consideration. 
5 EU law, Investment Law and Amicus Curiae 
Until now this thesis has discussed third party interveners by non-governmental regional 
and international organisations, various unions, interest centres and groups of civil society, 																																																								
251 BSG Resources Limited v. Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22). 
252 See Article 1, scope of application of the Transparency Rules, where it is enabled for parties to 
derogate and make reservations to the application of the relevant rules even in the case the 
underlying investment treaty making reference to the said rules is concluded. 
253 See also footnote 81. 
254 http://www.siac.org.sg/69-siac-news/469-public-consultation-on-draft-siac-investment-
arbitration-rules (accessed 20 May 2016). 
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which can be said to form the traditional types of amicus curiae parties within investment 
arbitration proceedings. The case law that has so far been researched also almost 
exclusively covers these sorts of interveners. More recently though, the EC has showed a 
more active role to intervene and submit its viewpoints within ongoing investor-state 
arbitrations. In this connection the EC has often opined and challenged the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal, stating that EU law prevails over the international investment 
agreement in which the relevant investment protection is included. In this chapter I take a 
closer look at the EC’s active role as a third party intervener in investment disputes and the 
admission process by which the EC has been accepted as a third party. First, I explain how 
EU law and investment law are intertwined through a research of the reasons the EC has 
raised to motivate its interventions – what has it argued and why? In this connection I 
explain the “MOX Plant” jurisprudence, established by the ECJ. Secondly, I discuss in 
more detail the situations in which the EC has intervened and under what conditions. 
Finally, I discuss whether the reasons for accepting its participation are legitimate and 
based on the arguments that underpin the contemporary role of amicus curiae. The 
question to be answered in its culmination is what implications the role granted to the EC 
has when taking into account the contemporary role of amicus curiae. I answer this 
question primarily by researching how third party interventions by the EC have taken place 
within the jurisprudence of the ICSID.255  
 
5.1. The Relationship Between International Investment Law and EU 
Law  
In order to better understand the mandate and the motivation for the EC to intervene and its 
role within investment arbitration, not to mention the difficulties this poses, international 
investment law has to be mirrored against EU law and vice versa. It is important to 
understand, first, how these two legal frameworks can coexist in harmony and, secondly, 
what the approach of the EC is towards the investment law regime, i.e., whether their 
respective goals are compatible with each other. Answering this question is also of 
importance since we will see that it opens a door to something bigger and maybe 
																																																								
255 Due to availability of case material the research will be limited to study the cases before the 
ICSID and thus leaving outside other possible tribunals. In addition the known cases where the EU 
Commission has acted as amicus curiae has mostly been in cases before the ICSID, and thus 
another reason for the delimitation of the research. 
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something more problematic, which is the issue of treaty conflict and the possibilities of 
resolving disputes concerning matters governed by EU law in front of an arbitral tribunal. 
 
5.1.1. The Coexistence of Investment Law and EU Law 
As explained in chapter 2.5. above, the EC has, since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, a mandate to negotiate and sign investment treaties with third countries as well as to 
regulate on matters concerning FDIs and the protection of such investments. This power is 
established in Article 207 of the TFEU. During the time before the Lisbon Treaty, 
investment protection and treaties including investment protection mechanisms were left to 
the discretion of the member states. Since the scenery has changed, difficult questions 
regarding the interaction between investment protection and EU law have arisen, 
especially regarding EU obligations that member states are bound to observe. Today the 
investment protection regime, including the dispute settlement mechanisms, is built on a 
few multilateral investment agreements and approximately 3 000 BITs, of which about 1 
200 are within the EU.256Additionally it is of importance to note the differentiation 
between “intra-EU” and “extra-EU” bilateral investment relationships. Intra-EU BITs are 
treaties signed between two EU member states, whereas extra-EU BITs are treaties 
concluded between one EU member state and a third non-EU state.257 There are still some 
190 intra-EU BITs and it is these treaties that are of relevance here. After the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty including the new mandate of the EU to regulate on international 
investments, the challenges that where identified at the crossroad of international 
investment law and EU law, were, i.a., the promotion of transparency, consistency and 
predictability.258 However, the particular challenge of the coexistence of already existing 
international investment agreements and the new EU competence was not foreseen, and the 
possibility of the EC participating actively in order to contribute to treaty conflicts was not 
even discussed.  
 
Both EU law and international investment law address investment protection through 
substantive provisions and provide remedies for the enforcement of such provisions. In 
other words they address identical substantive matters. The issue arises since both legal 																																																								
256 Of these 1200 approximately 1000 are extra-EU BITs and about 190 consists of intra-EU BITs. 
257 Dolzer; Schreuer (2012), pp. 11-12. 
258 International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), Annex: Communication of the Commission 
“Towards a comprehensive European International Investment Policy”, p. 10. 
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frameworks make reference to their prominent competent instances for the resolving 
disputes under investment protection. When applying EU law in a case where the parties 
face an investment dispute, the parties should seek recourse through the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).259 On the other hand when applying an IIA, reference is, as we have seen, 
often made to the ICSID.  There have been numerous cases before the ICSID that address 
this specific question,260 namely that EU law and international investment law address the 
same matters. Within such disputes many member states as well as the EC have tried to 
intervene in order to opine on the interpretation of the conflict between EU law and 
investment law, claiming that EU law prevails over investment agreements and that the 
substantive rules provided for within EU law will rule over the competing IIA. The arbitral 
tribunal has in the vast majority of such cases that have been made publically available 
dismissed these objections and concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear the case initially 
brought before it by the private investor. It goes without saying that the existence of such a 
legal uncertainty means that the private investor is exposed to a rather uncertain investment 
environment. The question posed earlier can for the time being be answered by stating that 
international investment law and EU law are not coexisting in harmony.  
 
5.1.2. The MOX-Plant Jurisprudence 
When discussing the second difficult question, namely the approach of the EC towards 
investment law and investment arbitration, the role of the EC more concretely comes into 
play and it is in respect of this issue that the EC has been an active intervener in investor-
state arbitrations. The EC’s opinion and approach towards the relationship between 
investment law and EU law can be summarized from reading its third party submissions 
for instance in the Eureko case, 261 which was a PCA arbitration conducted under the 1976 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Eureko case touched upon the relationship between 
international investment law and EU law, and one of the questions was whether EU law 
can render arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs inapplicable. According to the respondent 																																																								
259 This will be elaborated further below when discussing the Commission v. Ireland case below 
(ECJ C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] E.C.R., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 30 
May 2006, I-4657). 
260 See for instance the following cases: Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Eastern Sugar B.V. 
(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004; Binder v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL; Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL. 
261 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic). 
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state, the Slovak Republic, an arbitration clause found in a BIT is deemed to be invalid 
since EU law governs the same subject matter as the intra-EU BIT, and in such cases the 
EU law should prevail and consequently render the arbitration clause invalid. According to 
the respondent, the termination of the BIT would, by virtue of article 30 and 59 in the 
Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties (VCLT), 262  be a consequence of the 
membership of the Slovak Republic to the EU, since the later treaty addressing the same 
subject matter terminates an earlier treaty.263 
 
In the Eureko case the EC builds the basis for its claims in its third party submission on the 
jurisprudence that was established by the ECJ in Commission v. Ireland,264 also called as 
the MOX-Plant jurisprudence. This decision held that the ECJ has exclusive mandate to 
resolve matters between two EU member states when the subject matter of the case is to 
some extent covered by EU law. The exclusive mandate of the ECJ to rule on matters 
governed by EU law is derived from the obligation of the member states to submit disputes 
to the community judicial system as established in article 292 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (EC Treaty). 265  Correspondingly, in cases where another 
international agreement addresses the same questions as EU law, the ECJ should be the 
body interpreting the regulation addressing such matters, and to submit such disputes 
before another judicial body would be in breach of obligations imposed by EU law. 
Analogically applied to the relationship between EU law and investment law, this means 
that intra-EU matters should according to the MOX-Plant jurisprudence not be pursued 
within arbitral tribunals, but instead before the ECJ which has exclusive jurisdiction to rule 
upon such matters. 
 
Moreover, what is quite interesting, it was the respondent in the Eureko case that asked the 
tribunal to invite the EC (and the Government of the Netherlands) to act as amicus curiae 
in order to assist in the interpretation of the BIT. The tribunal finally did so after having 																																																								
262 Article 59 in the VCLT states that ” [a] treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties 
to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter…”. 
263 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, §. 19. 
264 ECJ C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] E.C.R., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 
30 May 2006, I-4657. 
265 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version 2002), OJ C 325, 24 
December 2002, pp. 33-184. Article 292 of the EC Treaty states that “Member States undertake not 
to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein.” 
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reached an agreement with the claimant.266 This can be contrasted to what the tribunal 
stated in Aguas Argentinas where it described the request to act as amicus curiae as an 
“offer of assistance”. The Eureko tribunal thus goes quite far by actually inviting the EC to 
participate. In Eureko the tribunal assumed jurisdiction to hear the case by postponing the 
question of the application of EU law to the merits phase of the proceeding, in which it 
later rejects the claims for the application of EU law to the dispute. In the jurisdictional 
phase, the respondent and the EC claimed that the arbitral tribunal would not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case, since EU law would prevail over international treaties and 
recourse should be made to the ECJ. 267  Nevertheless, the tribunal clearly rejected the 
argument that the ECJ would have “interpretative monopoly” to rule on matters of EU 
law,268 and further stated that even the application of EU law in the merits stage would by 
no means withdraw its competence to hear the dispute.269 
 
By first rejecting the claims on lack of jurisdiction, the tribunal addressed the applicability 
of EU law in the merits phase, as part of the applicable law set out in the BIT between the 
disputing parties. In the final award the tribunal stated that there are no such provisions in 
EU law that would burden the decision making of the tribunal so as to render a decision 
based on the BIT between the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic to be in breach with 
EU law.270 Regarding the correlation between EU law and the treaty between the parties, 
the tribunal further noted that “insofar as they are applicable to the facts in the present 
case, nothing in those Treaty standards is in conflict with any provision of EU law. 
Nothing in this Award amounts to, or implies, a decision that Respondent or Claimant has 
acted in conformity with EU law or contrary to EU law in any respect. This Award has no 
bearing upon any question of EU law. This Award relates only to the compliance by 
Respondent with the terms of the obligations it has assumed under the agreement that it 
made with the Treaty.”271  
 
																																																								
266 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, §§. 151, 154. 
267 Ibid., §§. 178-182, 278.  
268 Ibid., §. 282. 
269 Ibid., §. 283. 
270 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Final Award, 7 December 2012, §. 275. 
271 Ibid., §. 276. 
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The arbitral tribunal in Eureko in other words both assumes its jurisdiction and rejects the 
application of EU law, since the parties did not raise any specific objections regarding any 
EU law provision. Nevertheless, the tribunal further notes that the obligations under the 
investment treaty are not in conflict with EU law. Thereby the tribunal de facto addresses 
the relationship between EU law and international investment law. Should the tribunal 
have found EU law applicable to the dispute it would have addressed matters governed by 
EU law since having already assumed jurisdiction, meaning that the MOX-Plant 
jurisprudence would have been bypassed.  
 
The Eureko case is a great example of the problematic relationship between international 
investment law and EU law, where fragmentation of international law takes place in 
practice.272 International arbitration procedures are sort of battlefields for conflicting legal 
frameworks and competing judicial and arbitral mechanisms and through such disputes the 
approach of the EC has become clear. In Eureko not only was the issue of fragmentation of 
international law pointed out; the EC in its submission also addressed the issue of forum 
shopping that a system comprising of competing judicial systems can lead to.273 In forum 
shopping parties can freely choose which instance they make recourse to, according to 
their desires, leading to a fragmented and legally uncertain situation. The risk of forum 
shopping is evident in a situation where it is not clear which judicial body is the correct 
instance to resolve the dispute at hand and where multiple instances can be addressed. 
 
5.2. The EC: a True Friend of the Court or an Intruder?  
In the previous chapter I addressed the underlying reason for the EC to participate as 
amicus curiae. The EC has recently participated for reasons related to the interaction 																																																								
272 This problematic can further be illustrated for instance by the reasoning of the ECJ in the 
Commission v. Ireland case (ECJ C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] E.C.R., Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber), 30 May 2006, I-4657), where it states that “[t]he act of submitting a 
dispute of this nature to a judicial forum such as the Arbitral Tribunal involves the risk that a 
judicial forum other than the Court will rule on the scope of the obligations imposed on the 
Member States pursuant to Community law.” The distress of the ECJ arouse from the fact that this 
course of action would lead to that matters that should belong to the exclusive mandate of the ECJ 
would now be ruled within another judicial forum (ECJ C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] 
E.C.R., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 30 May 2006, §. 177).  
273 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, §. 185. The same had 
already earlier been stated by the EC in the case of Eastern Sugar (Eastern Sugar B.V. 
(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, §. 
126).  
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between EU law and international investment law as well as questions of the applicable 
law. As has also been discussed above, the desire for transparency in connection with the 
rulemaking and the resolving of disputes is especially high within the EU, and has surfaced 
in relation to the recent and on going TTIP negotiations. In this chapter I research the role 
of the EC as amicus curiae in light of these underlying issues. I will in more detail answer 
the question whether the prerequisites for accepting third party intervention, set up in the 
case law of the ICSID, equally apply to the EC. Does the participation of the EC in other 
words fulfil the requirements for accepting a third party intervention? I also examine 
whether the position granted to the EC as amicus curiae is legitimate. In this connection I 
research the role of the EC within the doctrine of the modern amicus curiae.  
 
The participation of the EC might lead to certain concerns. As we have seen above, the 
participation of amicus in investment arbitrations has traditionally been conducted by 
regional or international NGOs. It is not until recently that the EC has taken an active role 
as amicus curiae before investment tribunals. According to Rule 37 (2) in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, a tribunal may allow an amicus to opine on matters of law or fact within 
the scope of the dispute, to the extent it can provide the arbitral tribunal with objective 
viewpoints in addition to those of the disputing parties. Additionally, the third party 
intervener should be independent from the disputing parties and have a significant interest 
in the dispute. The concerns that arise can be divided into three categories. First, concerns 
relate to the requirement to have a significant interest in the dispute. Is this interest 
stretched too far when it comes to the EC, and can it be said that the EC has actually, 
instead of being regarded as an independent and neutral advisor, sought to achieve certain 
politically motivated outcomes? In this connection the criticism in legal literature towards 
the political motivation of the EC to participate especially in AES v. Hungary274 can be 
mentioned. As we will see in the following, it is not only in AES v. Hungary where the EC 
has showed great interest to express its opinions; the picture is indeed much bigger than 
this one case. Further, concerns might likewise relate to other purely procedural aspects of 
the participation of the EC as amicus. The second concern relates to the requirement that 
the issues raised by the amicus intervener should be within the scope of the subject matter 
as put forward by the disputing parties. This is not always the case when it comes to the 
EC. Thirdly, the requirement that the intervening party should be independent from the 																																																								
274 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22. 
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original parties without them being prejudiced by the intervention likewise poses some 
problems. These three concerns will be discussed below. 
 
5.2.1. Interest in the Dispute 
Concerns relating to the political motivations behind the intervention of a third party have 
been expressed by the scholar and practitioner Mariel Dimsey,275 who in particular has 
criticised the political incentives of the EC to participate as amicus in the AES v. Hungary 
arbitration.276 The EC was allowed to act as a third party intervener within the merits phase 
in AES v. Hungary, which was an ECT arbitration ruled under the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, even though it was denied access to the parties written submissions. 277 
Unfortunately the deliberations and the decision of the tribunal when accepting the EC as 
amicus curiae are not publicly available, which leaves us with no possibility to further 
analyse the procedure in which the EC was granted leave to intervene in AES v. Hungary. 
Nevertheless, the arguments raised by the EC are analogic to those raised by it when 
participating in other investor-state arbitrations and thus the concern of the politicisation of 
investment arbitration is connected with the role of the EC as amicus in investor-state 
disputes more generally.  
 
Dimsey also points out that “a fine line must be trod: a party must have an interest in the 
subject matter of the dispute, but cannot be interested in its outcome”.278 As we have seen, 
the prerequisites for a party to be granted leave to intervene as amicus are mentioned in 
various arbitration rules and have moreover been shaped through case law. First, Rule 37 
(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules states that the party wishing to intervene should have a 
“significant interest in the proceeding”, but at the same time the arbitral tribunal has to be 
reassured that such submission would not “unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either 
party”. 
 
Addressing the concerns raised, it can firstly be noted that it would be highly unlikely to 
expect that a non-disputing party wishing to intervene in a matter of significant interest 
																																																								
275 Dimsey (2015), pp. 134-135.  
276 Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
277 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22, Award 23 September 2010, §§. 3.18, 3.22. 
278 Dimsey (2015), p. 179. 
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would not likewise have a strong interest in the outcome of the dispute. To illustrate this 
situation the Aguas Argenitans case can be mentioned, which is the very case where the 
prerequisites to allow amicus was set up. In the case the amicus represented the interests 
that where at issue, namely the right to some basic public services, as well as 
environmental and human rights issues.279 It is natural that the outcome of the dispute, 
namely whether the acts of the state for protecting the public access to some basic public 
services are condemned or not by the arbitral tribunal, is in the interest of the NGOs 
protecting precisely these rights, whether these interests are political, environmental on 
regarding human rights.  
 
The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), which is an active amicus 
participator in investor-state disputes (amongst many cases it participated as amicus in the 
Aguas Argentinas case), has listed the goals of NGOs when intervening as amicus very 
clearly in a publication together with a human rights interest organisation. The publication 
states that: “One of the key goals of amicus intervention for NGOs has been to ensure that 
tribunal decisions take into account human rights law obligations and/or take into account 
the perspective of rights holders impacted by the decision.”280 It is thus clear that the 
intervening party not only has an interest in a dispute, but also in its outcome. 
 
To demand that the interest of the non-disputing party should not extend to the outcome of 
the dispute would deprive a fundamental notion of the amicus curiae institution, namely 
the right of non-disputing parties to opine on matters within their substantial interests. 
Posing such a restriction would render the amicus curiae institution illusory. In such a case 
the amicus would more or less be comparable to a witness witnessing within the arbitral 
process, which is something the arbitral tribunals have clearly stated should not be the 
case.281 Secondly, as concerns the examination of whether the non-disputing party is 
suitable to act as amicus, the arbitral tribunal has a wide margin of appreciation when 																																																								
279 The third party petitioners were Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), 
Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and 
Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores. 
280 ”Guide for Potential Amici in International Investment Arbitration”, January 2014, produced by 
the International Human Rights Program (IHRP) at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law and 
the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), p. 12. 
281 See for instance Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of 
the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, §. 
36. 
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weighing the rights of all parties. It is here where the tribunal will have to decide whether 
the political incentives the amicus might have are outweighed by the added value a third 
party submission will bring to the resolution of the dispute. I thus argue that the concerns 
regarding the incentive of the EC to participate are unfounded.     
 
5.2.2. Within the Scope of the Dispute 
The second concern relates to the scope of the matter on which the amicus curiae can 
address its opinions. In this connection, the Electrabel case282 serves as a good example. In 
Electrabel the claimant, Electrabel S.A., which a Belgian energy company, advanced 
claims of expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treatment by Hungary under the 
ECT due to the early termination of a power purchase agreement. The respondent argued 
that the acts taken by the Hungarian government was the response by Hungary to comply 
with a decision by the EC, posing an obligation to terminate the said power purchase 
agreement based on a finding that compensation under the power purchase agreement 
constituted illegal state aid.283 In Electrabel the EC, which in the words of the tribunal, has 
“much more than a significant interest” in the dispute,284 was admitted to participate as 
amicus concerning matters relating to both the jurisdiction of the tribunal as well as the 
applicable law.285 The tribunal granted leave to the EC to submit third party submissions 
since it held that the EC, as “an expert commentator on European Community law”, could 
assist the tribunal by “addressing several legal issues” including the harmonious 
application of EU law and the ECT.286 One question was whether EU law should be 
applicable to the dispute as applicable law or as supporting facts within the analysis of the 
actions taken by the respondent.287 Also, the EC was admitted access to the parties written 
submissions, since the EC was seen to have a significant interest as an amicus. Such broad 
access was justified in order not to limit the EC’s participation to a “pure legal moot of 																																																								
282 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. Since the claims by the 
claimant were advanced solely under the ECT, the Tribunal particularly excluded this case from the 
context of other intra-EU BIT cases.  
283 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award, 25 November 
2015, §. 97. 
284 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, §. 4.92. 
285 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No. 4, 
28 April 2009, §§. 2, 23. 
286 Ibid., §. 24. 
287 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, §. 4.114. 
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academic interest only and thus deprive it of any effective role as an amicus”.288 Such a 
practice, in which the amicus is given access to the parties’ submissions without both 
parties consent, had not previously been applied before an ICSID tribunal.289 
 
Not only did the tribunal give the EC broad procedural rights with regard to access to case 
material, it also granted the EC leave to opine on the jurisdiction of the tribunal, which was 
a matter originally not disputed by the parties.290 According to what have been stated 
above regarding rule 37 (2) (b) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the submission of the third 
party intervener should be within the scope of the dispute. Case law suggests the same and 
therefore the practice by the Electrabel tribunal is clearly opposing the prerequisites as set 
out in Aguas Argentinas. Even though the tribunal dismissed the EC’s arguments on non-
jurisdiction, the present case certainly leads one to question why the tribunal in Electrabel 
gave the amicus such a wide mandate.  
 
The views of arbitral tribunals regarding which matters amicus are fit to address are 
divided. Tribunals have previously stated that amicus would not be suitable to address 
matters concerning the jurisdictional phase,291 but has admitted amicus to do so in other 
cases,292 as has been seen for instance in the cases discussed in connection with the EC as a 
third party intervener. The significant difference in the Electrabel case in comparison to 
other cases where amicus has addressed jurisdictional matters is nevertheless that the 
parties did not initially dispute the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, the tribunal took the 
opinion of the EC on questions of jurisdiction into great consideration. The rule expressed 
in article 37 (2) (b) is an expression of the consensuality of arbitration, i.e., the parties are 
free to define the matter under dispute. Therefore a third party submission should not 
extend the scope of the dispute in front of the arbitral tribunal. It is, however, the task of 
																																																								
288 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No. 4, 
28 April 2009, §. 29. 
289 Ibid., §. 28. 
290 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, §§. 2.3, 4.33, 4.92, 4.115. 
291 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, §. 71. 
292 “Requirements for Amicus Curiae Participation in International Investment Arbitration – A 
Deconstruction of the Procedural Wall Erected in Joint ICSID Cases ARB/10/25 and ARB/10/15”, 
Christian Schliemann, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 12, 2013, p. 
375. 
		 78	
the tribunal to independently and ex officio decide on its own jurisdiction,293 according to 
the competence-competence principle,294 but to extend the reasoning and to take into 
account the submissions made by a third party, regarding matters that were originally not 
disputed by the parties, is giving the amicus an inherently strong standing.295   
 
A further analysis of the procedure itself by which the tribunal in Electrabel accepted the 
EC to intervene is unfortunately impossible, since the tribunal simply accepted the amicus 
application based on an exercise of its discretion under Rule 37 (2) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, noting that it took into consideration the parties diverse observations on 
the application of the EC to participate as amicus.296 What nevertheless can be read out 
from this case in comparison to previous amicus case law is that the role of the EC seems 
as very significant and that its opinions are given way more weight than has traditionally 
been accorded to third parties. What might justify the inherently strong role of the EC in 
this case is the fact that the EC, like the disputing parties, is a member of the ECT as well 
as the driving force of the EU behind the drafting of the ECT.  
 
5.2.3. The Independence of Amicus 
In addition to the broad scope of matters that the EC has been allowed to express its 
opinions on, it is highly questionable whether or not accepting the EC as amicus is 
sometimes burdensome and prejudicing for one of the parties, most often the claimant, 
which is nearly always a private investor. A fundamental issue that investment tribunals 
have underlined in connection with accepting amicus submissions is the safeguarding of 
procedural fairness, which was set out in Aguas Argentinas297 and further underlined in 																																																								
293 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, §. 5.2. 
294 The competence of the ICSID to determine its own competence is established in Article 41, 
where it is stated that “the tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence”. Of the ICSID 
Convention. See also Reed et al. (2010), pp. 126-127; “Ménage à trois? Jurisdiction, Admissibility, 
and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Veijo Heiskanen, ICSID Review, Volume 29 
No 1, 2014, p. 233. 
295 The strong presence and impact of the EC in the Electrabel-case can further be read from the 
wordings of the Tribunal in §§. 4.91-4.92 (Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012). 
296 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No. 4, 
28 April 2009, §. 22. 
297 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in response to 
petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005, §. 17. 
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posterior case law. As for the three criteria set out in the said case, we have seen that the 
tribunal has to make sure that the party wanting to intervene is independent from the 
original disputing parties and that accepting amicus would not burden one of the disputing 
parties, but instead raise with viewpoints that are supplementary to those provided by the 
parties.298 As it comes to the EC participating as amicus curiae, the independency is 
questionable. Since the respondent state is a member state of the EU, common financial 
and political interests are shared between the respondent state and the EC, intervening as a 
third party. Therefore the independency of the EC as an amicus intervener is questionable 
with regard to the burden it might have on the claimant, the individual investor.  	
The approach of the tribunal with regard of the independency of the EC, as well as the 
requirement of addressing issues within the scope of the dispute, can be compared to the 
case of Von Pezold.299 The claimant in Von Pezold alleged an investment treaty breach 
through unjustified and illegal expropriation, whereas these act where alleged by the 
respondent to be part of a land reform program taken by the Zimbabwean government. In 
front of the Von Pezold tribunal were four Zimbabwean indigenous communities, claiming 
territorial rights to the disputed land, as well as an European NGO wishing to join in the 
amicus submission.300  
 
The petitions for amicus submissions in Von Pezold were dismissed since the tribunal held, 
first, that the matter claimed by the amicus did not fall within the scope of the subject 
matter of the dispute. The dispute concerned landowners rights to land, but what the 
amicus petitioners wished address was the application of international human rights in the 
merits phase. The tribunal agreed with the claimant that “the reference to “such rules of 
general international law as may be applicable” in the BITs does not incorporate the 
universe of international law into the BITs or into disputes arising under the BITs” and 
that since the disputing parties had not relied upon the rights of indigenous people under 
international law, the latter would not be applicable within the dispute and therefore the 
																																																								
298 “Are Amici Curiae The Proper Response to the Public’s concerns on Transparency in 
Investment Arbitration?”, Alexis Mourre, The Law and Practice of International Tribunals, Volume 
5 Issue 2, 2006, p. 269. 
299 Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15. 
300 Bernhard Von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, 
Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012, §. 1. 
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issues addressed by the amicus fell outside the scope of the matters in front of the 
tribunal.301 
 
Secondly, the tribunal held that the amicus did not fulfil the criteria of independency, 
which is the criteria that in Von Pezold actually resulted in a dismissal of amicus curiae 
submissions.302 The claimants in the case attested that the amicus are not independent, 
since their interests are aligned with those of the respondent and that the indigenous 
communities acting as amicus are de facto organs of the state and therefore not 
independent from the respondent. 303  The tribunal was of the view that an amicus 
participation in Von Pezold would unfairly prejudice the claimant, wherefore it did not 
accept the third party intervention.  
 
In contrast to the cases where the EC has participated as amicus, the approach taken by the 
tribunal in Von Pezold is significantly more restrictive, even in light of the quasi identical 
conditions. When it rejected the petitions due to lack of independency and that the matter 
submitted by third parties fell outside the scope of the subject matter of the dispute. When 
taking into consideration the role of the EC as a representative of all of its member states, 
their common financial interests and generally the similarity of the interests and arguments 
put forth by the EC and the respondent state in investment disputes, the divergent approach 
of arbitral tribunal with regard of the EC proves that the traditional prerequisites are not 
followed. 
 
5.2.4. The Ioan Micula History 
The Ioan Micula case304 is a dispute under the Sweden-Romania BIT, which concerns 
breaches of investment protection alleged by the Swedish Micula brothers due to 
Romania’s implementation of certain regulatory changes, which according to the 
respondent state Romania were obligatory due to its accession to the EU and in order for 
the Romanian legislation to be in line with EU obligations. The Ioan Micula case is not 
merely a case providing an example of the EC acting as an amicus curiae giving useful 
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302 Ibid., §. 62. 
303 Ibid., §. 50. 
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information to the arbitral tribunal on treaty interpretation. It is rather a case to further 
illustrate the complexity and the obscurity of the role of the EC as a third party intervener 
and should be read as an extension of the aforementioned cases. Additionally, through 
various probative facts of the case, some conclusions regarding the interests of the EC in 
investor-state disputes can be drawn to add another piece to the puzzle.  
Before the Ioan Micula tribunal was the disagreement between the parties, not about the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, but concerning the law applicable to the dispute during 
the merits phase.305 In this case the EC again participated as amicus curiae.306 The tribunal 
noted that a submission by the EC could enlighten the tribunal regarding factual or legal 
perspectives, and by underlining the procedural rights of the parties, the tribunal added that 
“the European Community shall act as amicus curiae and not as amicus actoris vel rei. In 
other words, the non-disputing party shall remain a friend of the court and not a friend of 
either Party”.307 In its amicus briefs the EC took the same position as the respondent state, 
Romania, by stating that the interpretation of the BIT should be made in the context of EU 
law and that the latter should prevail in case of a conflict of norms.308 Consequently, the 
EC, hand in hand with the respondent, stated that an arbitral award obliging the respondent 
Romania to the payment of a compensation for an alleged breach of investment protection 
would render the award unenforceable within the EU.309 Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal 
asserted it’s authority to resolve the dispute by primarily relying on the BIT between the 
parties, and instead of interpreting the BIT in light of EU law, the acts of the respondent 
state were interpreted within the EU law context and its associated regulatory obligations 
in determining whether a treaty breach exists or not, thus applying EU law only as factual 
support.310 In a final award rendered on 11 December 2013 the tribunal held Romania 
liable for a breach of investment protection under the Sweden-Romanian BIT, dismissing 
Romania’s arguments that these acts were obligatory in order to comply with EU law, and 																																																								
305 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack 
S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award 11 December 2013, §. 289. 
306 Ibid., §§. 27, 316, 317. 
307 Ibid., §. 27. 
308 Ibid., §. 317. 
309 Ibid., §§. 330-336. In this connection the tribunal dismissed the claims by stating that “it is not 
desirable to embark on predictions as to the possible conduct of various persons and authorities 
after the Award has been rendered, especially but not exclusively when it comes to enforcement 
matters. It is thus inappropriate for the Tribunal to base its decision in this case on matters of EU 
law that may come to apply after the Award has been rendered.” (see §. 340). 
310 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack 
S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award 11 December 2013, §§. 318-329. 
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ordered Romania to compensate damages to the claimant amounting to approximately 
USD 250 million.311  
The EC now seeks to prohibit the enforcement of the arbitral award rendered in the Ioan 
Micula case in the United States. Through an amicus brief submitted on 4 February 2016 
to the United States Court of Appeals, in support of Romania’s appeal, the EC challenged a 
previous decision of the first instance rendering the arbitral award enforceable in the 
United States.312 In the submission the EC argues that the first instance US court failed to 
take into account the decision313 of the EC, where it stated that compensation paid by 
Romania in accordance with the final arbitral award constitutes unlawful state aid under 
EU law, because of which the enforcement of the arbitral award could not be upheld.314 
The submission by the EC before the US Court of Appeals is a prolongation of its active 
participation in the Ioan Micula case. The EC has also initiated actions against Romania 
and Sweden, ordering them to terminate their underlying BIT, i.e., the legal instrument that 
operated as the legal foundation for the arbitral proceeding in Ioan Micula.315 The amicus 
curiae participation in the original arbitral proceeding was thus only a starting point for the 
EC in the Ioan Micula history.  
 
Unfortunately, here again the deliberations regarding the acceptance of a third party 
intervention by the arbitral tribunal in the original dispute are not fully made publicly 
available, making the approach of the tribunal difficult to scrutinize. Instead, the important 
issue to understand from the overlapping proceedings in the Ioan Micula history is that the 
EC is trying to tackle a much broader problem than a pure opinion on treaty interpretation 
																																																								
311 Ibid., §. 1329.  
312 The “Opinion and Order” given 5 August 2015 by the United States District Court for The 
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in one particular case. The issue extends from jurisdiction and applicable law to the 
validity and enforceability of arbitral awards. This speaks for the view that the EC indeed 
has a strong political motivation in these proceedings, which per se does not make its 
participation unjustified. Nevertheless, what can be questioned is the broad procedural 
rights that has been granted to the EC when acting as amicus in investor-state arbitrations.  
6 Implications of the EC as Amicus Curiae  
The fragmentation of international law is one of the underlying reasons for why the 
investment arbitration regime is going through some turbulence. The core problem lies in 
the conflict between societal rationalities and different policy regimes that legal 
instruments and judicial bodies simply cannot solve. The issue at stake is not simply two 
opposing legal bodies of arguments that can be solved through arbitration, but instead 
fundamentally opposing desires and values. When an investment dispute is at hand, it is no 
longer a question about a conflict on an individual level, i.a., a conflict between the 
disputing parties. The conflict is about something much bigger, reaching to the level of a 
regime battle. The underlying different social regimes, and their pertinent conflicts, are 
simply embodied through these judicial questions and take form in arbitral proceedings.  
 
One might think that once a law is adopted, the underlying values are protected from 
conflicts in that they have been codified and written down. As legal theorists propose this 
is not the case. Instead the battle continues on a legal level and certain a priori 
democratically agreed values are actually found incompatible.316 It is thus argued that the 
core regime battle between conflicting interests, as we have seen is the case between 
investment law and EU law, will actually not start until when such interests are actually 
put up against each other, in front of for instance an arbitral tribunal. The regime battle 
between these two legal bodies is simply personified through the arbitral proceeding. In 
such regime battles, the amicus curiae institution might be adding fuel to the juxtaposition, 
broadening the scope of points of views that are taken into account. As comes to the EC, 																																																								
316 See for instance: ”Några teoretiska aspekter angående alternativ konfliktlösning och medling”, 
Kaijus Ervasti, Retfærd Nr 97 2002/2, p. 16;“Regime-Collisions: The Vein Search for Legal Unity 
in The Fragmentation of Global Law”, Andreas Fischer-Lescano; Gunther Teubner (translated by 
Michelle Everson), Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 25:999 Summer 2004, pp. 1003-
1004; ”Akhilleuksen Kilpi: Ensimmäiset Käräjät”, Samuli Hurri, Tiede & Edistys, Numero 2, 
2014, p. 142. 
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the right to amicus curiae intervention has thus enabled the tribunal to take into 
consideration an outside voice that simultaneously is an expert on such legal questions 
disputed. The EC thus has contributed to solving such situations of treaty conflict. 
 
In order to further enlighten and encourage the application of this theory to the practical 
issue at hand, a recent publication by scholar Ahmad Ghouri can be mentioned. Ghouri 
argues that the investor-state arbitral tribunals are in a good position in striking a balance 
between conflicting normative rules where, on the one side, are the rights of foreign 
investors and, on the other side, the rights of citizens.317 In the words of Ghouri, 
"[a]lthough international courts and tribunals have previously shown a tendency to avoid 
treaty conflicts instead of resolving them, investor-State tribunals must take up and resolve 
such conflicts, when they arise, for a just settlement of investment disputes, and to address 
the challenges posed to the system’s legitimacy and utility.”318 Precisely the same defence 
can be given in support of the resilient role that has been granted to the EC as amicus 
curiae by recent investment arbitration tribunals.  
  
The fear of Blackaby and Richard in 2010 was that “[a]t worst, the presence of amicus 
curiae—a further partisan party advocating a position on behalf of persons to whom it is 
unaccountable, behind closed doors, and without being afforded a full opportunity to make 
a meaningful contribution—may exacerbate the democratic deficit, politicize investment 
disputes, and disrupt proceedings, without assisting the tribunal to decide the matters in 
dispute.”319 These fears and risks of a wrongful application of the amicus curiae regime 
summarize, from a critical point of view, quite well the situation of the EC as amicus 
before investment tribunals, echoed with some of the concerns discussed in the previous 
chapter. I argue that the issue should instead be approached by highlighting the added 
value that an amicus curiae can provide in such situations of legal uncertainty. Further, 
notwithstanding such fears and criticism, the final outcome could de facto be enhanced 
legitimacy since the wisdoms of the EC through amicus submissions with regard of 
difficult questions of treaty conflicts will contribute to clarifying the situation of applicable 
law. This in turn would enforce the legal certainty and therefore also the legitimacy of 
investment arbitration. Nevertheless, the issue still relates to transparency. As we have 																																																								
317 “Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment Arbitration”, Ahmad Ghouri, International 
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seen, in many of the cases where the EC has participated as amicus, the case material is not 
made publicly available, making the presence of the EC sometimes difficult, if not 
impossible, to analyse. The suggestion is therefore, that in order to likewise fully enhance 
the transparency of investment arbitration, the participation of such third party 
interventions, when contributing to solving difficult questions expanding over the 
international law community as a whole, should be made publicly available.  
 
The amicus curiae institution is originally seen as a tool for the arbitral tribunal in 
fulfilling its most essential task, namely to arrive at the most rightful decision. In order to 
remind, the words of the Aguas tribunal can be cited once more: “The purpose of amicus 
submissions is to help the Tribunal arrive at a correct decision by providing it with 
arguments, and expertise and perspectives that the parties may not have provided. The 
Tribunal will therefore only accept amicus submissions from persons who establish to the 
Tribunal’s satisfaction that they have the expertise, experience, and independence to be of 
assistance in this case. ...”.320 As was argued in chapter 2.3., the tasks of the arbitral 
tribunal differs from the one in commercial arbitration and it is often in front of difficult 
public law questions represented with a public interest. As the right to participate as 
amicus curiae is specific for investment arbitration, this right might as well assist the 
tribunal in resolving complex issues such as treaty conflicts.  
 
When examining the role granted to the EC as a third party intervener in investor-state 
arbitrations, it is clear that the arguments for accepting such interventions follow what 
have traditionally been the case for amicus curiae, which is that it will help the court to 
come to a right conclusion. The acceptance of the EC as amicus curiae before investment 
tribunals does not follow the prerequisites as established in the discussed case law. As 
argued, there are nevertheless many reasons for which the role of the EC as it has been 
granted can be accepted. 
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7 Conclusions  
The answers to the research questions in this thesis will in the following be summarised. 
First, the participation of the EC as amicus curiae in investment arbitration does not follow 
the prerequisites for accepting third party interventions, as set out within the modern 
amicus curiae institution. Instead the participation of the EC follows the more classic 
definition of amicus curiae as simply helping the court come to a right conclusion. 
Secondly, the presence of the EC does not follow the underlying arguments of 
transparency and legitimacy, for accepting amicus curiae intervention. The participation of 
the EC does not follow the underlying argument of transparency for accepting such 
submissions, since proceedings involving the EC have not to extensively been made 
public. Neither is legitimacy enhanced a priori, since the EC as a third party has been 
granted evidently wide rights when intervening. The last research question is whether the 
role of the EC as a modern third party intervener in international investment arbitrations 
nevertheless can be accepted. The answer is in the positive. The participation of the EC 
serves an inherently important task in helping the court arrive at its most righteous decision 
regarding treaty interpretation in investor-state disputes and simultaneously contributing to 
solving a wider legal issue, which is the treaty conflict between EU law and international 
investment law. The role of the EC as a modern third party intervener in international 
investment arbitrations can therefore be accepted. 
 
As mentioned earlier the active role of the EC in investment arbitration proceedings was a 
situation not foreseen in the aftermath of the adoption of the Lisbon treaty. It was at that 
time noted that, in order to support further transparency within the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism, the amicus curiae institution should be promoted, but by no means 
was the active role of the EC in the resolving of treaty conflicts foreseen. This is an 
important observation showing the scope of the impact that the amicus curiae institution 
can have on such fundamental legal conflicts.  Regardless of whether the EC fits into the 
modern amicus curiae institution, its active participation as widely as it has been accepted 
by investment tribunals can be seen as a pragmatic solution to solving many of the 
problems international investment arbitration is facing.  
 
In order to conclude this thesis, it is essential to point out that the political discussion that 
the amicus curiae has been tainted with should be overseen and instead the focus should be 
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laid on the inherently important and fundamental role of the amicus curiae institution as 
such. The participation of the EC as third party intervener is a proof of the essential 
benefits the amicus curiae institution can bring to the international investment arbitration 
regime. This thesis comes to the conclusion, that, at best, amicus curiae is a friend of the 
court, and through that also a friend of the public society. 
